Combining Philosophers
Ideas for David O. Brink, Robert Nozick and Johann Winckelmann
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7 ideas
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
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2850
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How can emotivists explain someone who recognises morality but is indifferent to it? [Brink]
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2848
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Two people might agree in their emotional moral attitude while disagreeing in their judgement [Brink]
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2851
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Emotivists find it hard to analyse assertions of moral principles, rather than actual judgements [Brink]
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2853
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Emotivists claim to explain moral motivation by basing morality on non-cognitive attitudes [Brink]
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2852
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Emotivists tend to favour a redundancy theory of truth, making moral judgement meaningless [Brink]
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2849
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Emotivism implies relativism about moral meanings, but critics say disagreements are about moral reference [Brink]
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22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
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18648
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Freedom to live according to our own conception of the good is the ultimate value [Nozick, by Kymlicka]
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