Combining Philosophers

Ideas for H.Putnam/P.Oppenheim, Harry G. Frankfurt and Baruch de Spinoza

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30 ideas

22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
9228 Ranking order of desires reveals nothing, because none of them may be considered important [Frankfurt]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / f. Ethical non-cognitivism
4867 Whether nature is beautiful or orderly is entirely in relation to human imagination [Spinoza]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
9270 A 'wanton' is not a person, because they lack second-order volitions [Frankfurt]
9269 A person may be morally responsible without free will [Frankfurt]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
21873 Men only agree in nature if they are guided by reason [Spinoza]
21872 We seek our own advantage, and virtue is doing this rationally [Spinoza]
9238 Morality isn't based on reason; moral indignation is quite unlike disapproval of irrationality [Frankfurt]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
17189 The essence of man is modifications of the nature of God [Spinoza]
17207 By 'good' I mean what brings us ever closer to our model of human nature [Spinoza]
8019 Along with his pantheism, Spinoza equates ethics with the study of human nature [Spinoza, by MacIntyre]
17229 If infancy in humans was very rare, we would consider it a pitiful natural defect [Spinoza]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / d. Subjective value
9234 If you don't care about at least one thing, you can't find reasons to care about anything [Frankfurt]
4845 We don't want things because they are good; we judge things to be good because we want them [Spinoza]
9232 It is by caring about things that we infuse the world with importance [Frankfurt]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
9233 Our criteria for evaluating how to live offer an answer to the problem [Frankfurt]
9229 What is worthwhile for its own sake alone may be worth very little [Frankfurt]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
4848 Love is nothing else but pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external cause [Spinoza]
9235 Rather than loving things because we value them, I think we value things because we love them [Frankfurt]
9237 The paradigm case of pure love is not romantic, but that between parents and infants [Frankfurt]
9239 I value my children for their sake, but I also value my love for them for its own sake [Frankfurt]
17217 Love is joy with an external cause [Spinoza]
9236 Love can be cool, and it may not involve liking its object [Frankfurt]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / i. Self-interest
7833 Spinoza names self-interest as the sole source of value [Spinoza, by Stewart,M]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / j. Evil
17224 If our ideas were wholly adequate, we would have no concept of evil [Spinoza]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / f. Good as pleasure
21870 Music is good for a melancholic, bad for a mourner, and indifferent to the deaf [Spinoza]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
4860 Man's highest happiness consists of perfecting his understanding, or reason [Spinoza]
9227 We might not choose a very moral life, if the character or constitution was deficient [Frankfurt]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / a. Nature of pleasure
9230 People want to fulfill their desires, but also for their desires to be sustained [Frankfurt]
4847 Pleasure is a passive state in which the mind increases in perfection [Spinoza]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / f. Dangers of pleasure
4859 Pleasure is only bad in so far as it hinders a man's capability for action [Spinoza]