Combining Philosophers

Ideas for H.Putnam/P.Oppenheim, Immanuel Kant and John Kekes

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62 ideas

22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / a. Preconditions for ethics
5599 Without God, creation and free will, morality would be empty [Kant]
21415 Duty is impossible without prior moral feeling, conscience, love and self-respect [Kant]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / c. Purpose of ethics
19738 Values are an attempt to achieve well-being by bringing contingencies under control [Kekes]
20145 Values help us to control life, by connecting it to what is stable and manageable [Kekes]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
23096 Morality should aim to prevent all evil actions, not just autonomous ones [Kekes]
23095 Why should moral responsibility depend on autonomy, rather than social role or experience? [Kekes]
23087 Much human evil is not autonomous, so moral responsibility need not be autonomous [Kekes]
23089 Evil people may not be autonomously aware, if they misjudge the situation [Kekes]
23093 Moral and causal responsibility are not clearly distinct [Kekes]
23098 Effects show the existence of moral responsibility, and mental states show the degree [Kekes]
20170 Responsibility is unprovoked foreseeable harm, against society, arising from vicious character [Kekes]
23094 Ought implies can means moral responsibility needs autonomy [Kekes]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
5074 Kant united religion and philosophy, by basing obedience to law on reason instead of faith [Taylor,R on Kant]
8024 The categorical imperative says nothing about what our activities and ends should be [MacIntyre on Kant]
18235 Only human reason can confer value on our choices [Kant, by Korsgaard]
20165 Reason and morality do not coincide; immorality can be reasonable, with an ideology [Kekes]
20171 Practical reason is not universal and impersonal, because it depends on what success is [Kekes]
20175 If morality has to be rational, then moral conflicts need us to be irrational and immoral [Kekes]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
22390 Kant thought human nature was pure hedonism, so virtue is only possible via the categorical imperative [Foot on Kant]
23090 Liberals assume people are naturally free, equal, rational, and morally good [Kekes]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
21409 Moral principles do not involve feelings [Kant]
6196 People cannot come to morality through feeling, because morality must not be sensuous [Kant]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
9750 We must only value what others find acceptable [Kant, by Korsgaard]
20174 Relativists say all values are relative; pluralists concede much of that, but not 'human' values [Kekes]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
20158 Innumerable values arise for us, from our humanity, our culture, and our individuality [Kekes]
20159 Cultural values are interpretations of humanity, conduct, institutions, and evaluations [Kekes]
20161 The big value problems are evil (humanity), disenchantment (cultures), and boredom (individuals) [Kekes]
20160 Kant focuses exclusively on human values, and neglects cultural and personal values [Kekes on Kant]
20156 We are bound to regret some values we never aspired to [Kekes]
20150 There are far more values than we can pursue, so they are optional possibilities [Kekes]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
5576 We cannot derive moral laws from experience, as it is the mother of illusion [Kant]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / d. Subjective value
9749 Our rational choices confer value, arising from the sense that we ourselves are important [Kant, by Korsgaard]
7671 Values are created by human choices, and are not some intrinsic quality, out there [Kant, by Berlin]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
18675 Kant may rate two things as finally valuable: having a good will, and deserving happiness [Orsi on Kant]
22007 An autonomous agent has dignity [Würde], which has absolute worth [Kant, by Pinkard]
18234 The good will is unconditionally good, because it is the only possible source of value [Kant, by Korsgaard]
6192 Good or evil cannot be a thing, but only a maxim of action, making the person good or evil [Kant]
18239 What is contemplated must have a higher value than contemplation [Kant, by Korsgaard]
18238 Only a good will can give man's being, and hence the world, a final purpose [Kant]
21431 The love of man is required in order to present the world as a beautiful and perfect moral whole [Kant]
21437 All morality directs the will to love of others' ends, and respect for others' rights [Kant]
20151 Our attitudes include what possibilities we value, and also what is allowable, and unthinkable [Kekes]
20152 Unconditional commitments are our most basic convictions, saying what must never be done [Kekes]
20153 Doing the unthinkable damages ourselves, so it is more basic than any value [Kekes]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / a. Normativity
21455 We only understand what exists, and can find no sign of what ought to be in nature [Kant]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / f. Altruism
3717 Reverence is awareness of a value which demolishes my self-love [Kant]
3720 We may claim noble motives, but we cannot penetrate our secret impulses [Kant]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
21429 The duty of love is to makes the ends of others one's own [Kant]
23117 Love should be partial, and discriminate in favour of its object [Kekes]
23119 Sentimental love distorts its object [Kekes]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / j. Evil
20162 Evil isn't explained by nature, by monsters, by uncharacteristic actions, or by society [Kekes]
23088 Evil is not deviation from the good, any more than good is a deviation from evil [Kekes]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
3712 A good will is not good because of what it achieves [Kant]
3725 The good of an action is in the mind of the doer, not the consequences [Kant]
6197 Morality involves duty and respect for law, not love of the outcome [Kant]
23097 What matters for morality is the effects of action, not the psychological causes [Kekes]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / a. Nature of happiness
6193 Our happiness is all that matters, not as a sensation, but as satisfaction with our whole existence [Kant]
1452 Happiness is the condition of a rational being for whom everything goes as they wish [Kant]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / c. Value of happiness
1454 Morality is not about making ourselves happy, but about being worthy of happiness [Kant]
21061 Duty does not aim at an end, but gives rise to universal happiness as aim of the will [Kant]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
20157 Well-being needs correct attitudes and well-ordered commitments to local values [Kekes]
20154 Control is the key to well-being [Kekes]