Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Harry G. Frankfurt, J.L. Mackie and Philippa Foot
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27 ideas
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / b. Defining ethics
22445
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Morality shows murder is wrong, but not what counts as a murder [Foot]
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22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / c. Purpose of ethics
22444
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A moral system must deal with the dangers and benefits of life [Foot]
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22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
9228
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Ranking order of desires reveals nothing, because none of them may be considered important [Frankfurt]
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22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / e. Ethical cognitivism
23683
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Moral norms are objective, connected to facts about human goods [Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
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22392
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Morality is inescapable, in descriptive words such as 'dishonest', 'unjust' and 'uncharitable' [Foot]
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22451
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All people need affection, cooperation, community and help in trouble [Foot]
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22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / f. Ethical non-cognitivism
22485
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Non-cognitivists give the conditions of use of moral sentences as facts about the speaker [Foot]
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4761
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The 'error theory' of morals says there is no moral knowledge, because there are no moral facts [Mackie, by Engel]
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22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
22474
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Unlike aesthetic evaluation, moral evaluation needs a concept of responsibility [Foot]
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9270
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A 'wanton' is not a person, because they lack second-order volitions [Frankfurt]
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9269
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A person may be morally responsible without free will [Frankfurt]
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22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
23684
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Morality gives everyone reasons to act, irrespective of their desires [Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
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23690
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We all have reason to cultivate the virtues, even when we lack the desire [Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
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23685
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Reason is not a motivator of morality [Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
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23691
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Rejecting moral rules may be villainous, but it isn't inconsistent [Foot]
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23686
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Moral reason is not just neutral, because morality is part of the standard of rationality [Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
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23693
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Practical rationality must weigh both what is morally and what is non-morally required [Foot]
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9238
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Morality isn't based on reason; moral indignation is quite unlike disapproval of irrationality [Frankfurt]
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22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / d. Biological ethics
23431
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Human defects are just like plant or animal defects [Foot]
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22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
23687
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Moral virtues arise from human nature, as part of what makes us good human beings [Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
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22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
22477
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Calling a knife or farmer or speech or root good does not involve attitudes or feelings [Foot]
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22486
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The mistake is to think good grounds aren't enough for moral judgement, which also needs feelings [Foot]
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22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / k. Ethics from nature
23432
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Concepts such as function, welfare, flourishing and interests only apply to living things [Foot]
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22375
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Moral judgements need more than the relevant facts, if the same facts lead to 'x is good' and 'x is bad' [Foot]
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22493
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Sterility is a human defect, but the choice to be childless is not [Foot]
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22492
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Virtues are as necessary to humans as stings are to bees [Foot]
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23433
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Humans need courage like a plant needs roots [Foot]
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