Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Harry G. Frankfurt, J.L. Mackie and Philippa Foot
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19 ideas
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
22378
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We can't affirm a duty without saying why it matters if it is not performed [Foot]
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22487
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Moral arguments are grounded in human facts [Foot]
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22377
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Whether someone is rude is judged by agreed criteria, so the facts dictate the value [Foot]
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22376
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Facts and values are connected if we cannot choose what counts as evidence of rightness [Foot]
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22491
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Moral evaluations are not separate from facts, but concern particular facts about functioning [Foot]
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23434
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There is no fact-value gap in 'owls should see in the dark' [Foot]
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22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value
22447
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Saying something 'just is' right or wrong creates an illusion of fact and objectivity [Foot]
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22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / d. Subjective value
9232
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It is by caring about things that we infuse the world with importance [Frankfurt]
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9234
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If you don't care about at least one thing, you can't find reasons to care about anything [Frankfurt]
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22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
9229
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What is worthwhile for its own sake alone may be worth very little [Frankfurt]
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22452
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Do we have a concept of value, other than wanting something, or making an effort to get it? [Foot]
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9233
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Our criteria for evaluating how to live offer an answer to the problem [Frankfurt]
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23439
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Principles are not ultimate, but arise from the necessities of human life [Foot]
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22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / a. Normativity
23435
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If you demonstrate the reason to act, there is no further question of 'why should I?' [Foot]
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22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / b. Successful function
22381
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Being a good father seems to depend on intentions, rather than actual abilities [Foot]
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22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
9235
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Rather than loving things because we value them, I think we value things because we love them [Frankfurt]
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9236
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Love can be cool, and it may not involve liking its object [Frankfurt]
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9237
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The paradigm case of pure love is not romantic, but that between parents and infants [Frankfurt]
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9239
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I value my children for their sake, but I also value my love for them for its own sake [Frankfurt]
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