Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Hermarchus, Philippa Foot and David O. Brink
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46 ideas
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / b. Defining ethics
22445
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Morality shows murder is wrong, but not what counts as a murder [Foot]
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22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / c. Purpose of ethics
22444
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A moral system must deal with the dangers and benefits of life [Foot]
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22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / e. Ethical cognitivism
23683
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Moral norms are objective, connected to facts about human goods [Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
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22392
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Morality is inescapable, in descriptive words such as 'dishonest', 'unjust' and 'uncharitable' [Foot]
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22451
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All people need affection, cooperation, community and help in trouble [Foot]
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22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / f. Ethical non-cognitivism
22485
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Non-cognitivists give the conditions of use of moral sentences as facts about the speaker [Foot]
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22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
22474
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Unlike aesthetic evaluation, moral evaluation needs a concept of responsibility [Foot]
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22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
23684
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Morality gives everyone reasons to act, irrespective of their desires [Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
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23690
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We all have reason to cultivate the virtues, even when we lack the desire [Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
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23685
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Reason is not a motivator of morality [Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
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23691
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Rejecting moral rules may be villainous, but it isn't inconsistent [Foot]
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23686
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Moral reason is not just neutral, because morality is part of the standard of rationality [Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
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23693
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Practical rationality must weigh both what is morally and what is non-morally required [Foot]
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22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / d. Biological ethics
23431
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Human defects are just like plant or animal defects [Foot]
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22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
23687
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Moral virtues arise from human nature, as part of what makes us good human beings [Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
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22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
2848
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Two people might agree in their emotional moral attitude while disagreeing in their judgement [Brink]
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2851
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Emotivists find it hard to analyse assertions of moral principles, rather than actual judgements [Brink]
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22477
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Calling a knife or farmer or speech or root good does not involve attitudes or feelings [Foot]
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22486
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The mistake is to think good grounds aren't enough for moral judgement, which also needs feelings [Foot]
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2853
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Emotivists claim to explain moral motivation by basing morality on non-cognitive attitudes [Brink]
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2852
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Emotivists tend to favour a redundancy theory of truth, making moral judgement meaningless [Brink]
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2849
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Emotivism implies relativism about moral meanings, but critics say disagreements are about moral reference [Brink]
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2850
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How can emotivists explain someone who recognises morality but is indifferent to it? [Brink]
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22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / k. Ethics from nature
22492
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Virtues are as necessary to humans as stings are to bees [Foot]
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23433
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Humans need courage like a plant needs roots [Foot]
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23432
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Concepts such as function, welfare, flourishing and interests only apply to living things [Foot]
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22375
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Moral judgements need more than the relevant facts, if the same facts lead to 'x is good' and 'x is bad' [Foot]
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22493
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Sterility is a human defect, but the choice to be childless is not [Foot]
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22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
22378
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We can't affirm a duty without saying why it matters if it is not performed [Foot]
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22487
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Moral arguments are grounded in human facts [Foot]
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22377
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Whether someone is rude is judged by agreed criteria, so the facts dictate the value [Foot]
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22376
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Facts and values are connected if we cannot choose what counts as evidence of rightness [Foot]
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22491
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Moral evaluations are not separate from facts, but concern particular facts about functioning [Foot]
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23434
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There is no fact-value gap in 'owls should see in the dark' [Foot]
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22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value
22447
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Saying something 'just is' right or wrong creates an illusion of fact and objectivity [Foot]
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22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
23439
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Principles are not ultimate, but arise from the necessities of human life [Foot]
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22452
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Do we have a concept of value, other than wanting something, or making an effort to get it? [Foot]
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22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / a. Normativity
23435
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If you demonstrate the reason to act, there is no further question of 'why should I?' [Foot]
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22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / b. Successful function
22381
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Being a good father seems to depend on intentions, rather than actual abilities [Foot]
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22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
22379
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The meaning of 'good' and other evaluations must include the object to which they attach [Foot]
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22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
22458
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Consequentialists can hurt the innocent in order to prevent further wickedness [Foot]
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22460
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Why might we think that a state of affairs can be morally good or bad? [Foot]
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22461
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Good outcomes are not external guides to morality, but a part of virtuous actions [Foot]
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22464
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The idea of a good state of affairs has no role in the thought of Aristotle, Rawls or Scanlon [Foot]
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22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / a. Nature of happiness
22497
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Deep happiness usually comes from the basic things in life [Foot]
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22498
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Happiness is enjoying the pursuit and attainment of right ends [Foot]
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