Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Hippolytus, Chrysippus and Aristotle

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22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
We aim not to identify goodness, but to be good [Aristotle]
We must take for granted that we should act according to right principle [Aristotle]
There is no fixed art of good conduct, and each situation is different, as in navigation [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
Acts are voluntary if done knowingly, by the agent, and in his power to avoid it [Aristotle]
Fate initiates general causes, but individual wills and characters dictate what we do [Chrysippus]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Men are physically prime at thirty-five, and mentally prime at forty-nine [Aristotle]
Human purpose is to contemplate and imitate the cosmos [Chrysippus]
Perhaps we get a better account of happiness as the good for man if we know his function [Aristotle]
If bodily organs have functions, presumably the whole person has one [Aristotle]
To eat vast amounts is unnatural, since natural desire is to replenish the deficiency [Aristotle]
What is natural for us is either there at birth, or appears by normal processes [Aristotle]
Aristotle never actually says that man is a rational animal [Aristotle, by Fogelin]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / f. Übermensch
For the great-souled man it is sometimes better to be dead [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
We all feel universal right and wrong, independent of any community or contracts [Aristotle]
Aristotle said there are two levels of virtue - the conventional and the intellectual [Taylor,R on Aristotle]
Moral acts are so varied that they must be convention, not nature [Aristotle]
Some say slavery is unnatural and created by convention, and is therefore forced, and unjust [Aristotle]
Stoics say justice is a part of nature, not just an invented principle [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / k. Ethics from nature
Only nature is available to guide action and virtue [Chrysippus]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
For Aristotle 'good' means purpose, and value is real but relational [Achtenberg on Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / e. Means and ends
We desire final things just for themselves, and not for the sake of something else [Aristotle]
How can an action be intrinsically good if it is a means to 'eudaimonia'? [Ackrill on Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
No one would choose life just for activities not done for their own sake [Aristotle]
Live in agreement, according to experience of natural events [Chrysippus]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / b. Successful function
Each thing that has a function is for the sake of that function [Aristotle]
Each named function has a distinctive excellence attached to it [Aristotle]
Wearing a shoe is its intrinsic use, and selling it (as a shoe) is its coincidental use [Aristotle]
A thing's active function is its end [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / d. Health
Excess and deficiency are bad for virtue, just as they are for bodily health [Aristotle]
Disreputable pleasures are only pleasant to persons with diseased perception [Aristotle]
Everything seeks, not a single good, but its own separate good [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
The more virtuous and happy a person is, the worse the prospect becomes of ending life [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / f. Altruism
All altruism is an extension of self-love [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Only lovable things are loved, and they must be good, or pleasant, or useful [Aristotle]
Most people want to be loved rather than to love, because they desire honour [Aristotle]
Spirit [thumos] is the capacity by which we love [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / h. Fine deeds
Slaves can't be happy, because they lack freedom [Aristotle]
Good people enjoy virtuous action, just as musicians enjoy beautiful melodies [Aristotle]
Oxen, horses and children cannot be happy, because they cannot perform fine deeds [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / i. Self-interest
Self-love benefits ourselves, and also helps others [Aristotle]
Selfishness is wrong not because it is self-love, but because it is excessive [Aristotle]
The best people exercise their virtue towards others, rather than to themselves [Aristotle]
For Aristotle, true self-love is love of the higher parts of one's soul [Aristotle, by Annas]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good
The good is 'that at which all things aim' [Aristotle]
Each category of existence has its own good, so one Good cannot unite them [Aristotle]
There should be one science of the one Good, but there are many overlapping sciences [Aristotle]
Is the good a purpose, a source of movement, or a pure form? [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
Goodness is when a thing (such as a circle) is complete, and conforms with its nature [Aristotle]
Intelligence and sight, and some pleasures and honours, are candidates for being good in themselves [Aristotle]
Goods are external, of the soul, and of the body; those of the soul (such as action) come first [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / d. Good as virtue
Living happily is nothing but living virtuously [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / f. Good as pleasure
Pleasure is not the good, because there are disgraceful pleasures [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
Justice can be preserved if pleasure is a good, but not if it is the goal [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
Pleasure is not the Good, and not every pleasure is desirable [Aristotle]
The masses believe, not unreasonably, that the good is pleasure [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
Clearly perfect conduct will involve both good intention and good action [Aristotle]
We judge people from their deeds because we cannot see their choices (which matter more) [Aristotle]
The function of good men is to confer benefits [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / h. Good as benefit
Wealth is not the good, because it is only a means [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / a. Nature of happiness
You can be good while asleep, or passive, or in pain [Aristotle]
Happiness seems to involve virtue, or practical reason, or wisdom, or pleasure, or external goods [Aristotle]
Horses, birds and fish are not happy, lacking a divine aspect to their natures [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / b. Eudaimonia
Eudaimonia is said to only have final value, where reason and virtue are also useful [Aristotle, by Orsi]
Does Aristotle say eudaimonia is the aim, or that it ought to be? [McDowell on Aristotle]
Some good and evil can happen to the dead, just as the living may be unaware of a disaster [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / c. Value of happiness
Aristotle is unsure about eudaimonia because he is unsure what people are [Nagel on Aristotle]
Goods like pleasure are chosen partly for happiness, but happiness is chosen just for itself [Aristotle]
Happiness is perfect and self-sufficient, the end of all action [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
Happiness needs total goodness and a complete life [Aristotle]
The happy life is in accordance with goodness, which implies seriousness [Aristotle]
Happiness is composed of a catalogue of internal and external benefits [Aristotle]
If happiness can be achieved by study and effort, then it is open to anyone who is not corrupt [Aristotle]
Happiness is activity in accordance with complete virtue, for a whole life, with adequate external goods [Aristotle]
Happiness involves three things, of which the greatest is either wisdom, virtue, or pleasure [Aristotle]
The best life is that of the intellect, since that is in the fullest sense the man [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / a. Nature of pleasure
Pleasure and pain are perceptions of things as good or bad [Aristotle]
For Aristotle, pleasure is the perception of particulars as valuable [Achtenberg on Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / b. Types of pleasure
There are pleasures of the soul (e.g. civic honour, and learning) and of the body [Aristotle]
Intellectual pleasures are superior to sensuous ones [Aristotle]
God feels one simple pleasure forever [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / c. Value of pleasure
If we criticise bodily pleasures as licentious and bad, why do we consider their opposite, pain, to be bad? [Aristotle]
Nobody would choose the mentality of a child, even if they had the greatest childish pleasures [Aristotle]
There are shameful pleasures, and nothing shameful is good, so pleasure is not a good [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
It is right to pursue pleasure, because it enhances life, and life is a thing to choose [Aristotle]
There are many things we would want even if they brought no pleasure [Aristotle]
If happiness were mere amusement it wouldn't be worth a lifetime's effort [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / d. Sources of pleasure
Some things are not naturally pleasant, but become so through disease or depravity [Aristotle]
While replenishing we even enjoy unpleasant things, but only absolute pleasures when we are replenished [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / e. Role of pleasure
Feeling inappropriate pleasure or pain affects conduct, and is central to morality [Aristotle]
Character is revealed by the pleasures and pains people feel [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / f. Dangers of pleasure
The greater the pleasure, the greater the hindrance to thought [Aristotle]