Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Peter B. Lewis, A.J. Ayer and Andrew Shorten
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11 ideas
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / b. Defining ethics
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6968
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Some people think there are ethical facts, but of a 'queer' sort [Ayer]
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6972
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A right attitude is just an attitude one is prepared to stand by [Ayer]
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22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
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6973
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Moral theories are all meta-ethical, and are neutral as regards actual conduct [Ayer]
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6974
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Moral judgements cannot be the logical consequence of a moral philosophy [Ayer]
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22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
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5205
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Moral intuition is worthless if there is no criterion to decide between intuitions [Ayer]
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6971
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I would describe intuitions of good as feelings of approval [Ayer]
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22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
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23725
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Ayer defends the emotivist version of expressivism [Ayer, by Smith,M]
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5206
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To say an act is wrong makes no further statement about it, but merely expresses disapproval [Ayer]
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6969
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Approval of historical or fictional murders gives us leave to imitate them [Ayer]
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6970
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Moral judgements are not expressions, but are elements in a behaviour pattern [Ayer]
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22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / i. Prescriptivism
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5168
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Moral approval and disapproval concerns classes of actions, rather than particular actions [Ayer]
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