Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Stephen Houlgate, J Ladyman / D Ross and Richard M. Hare
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17 ideas
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / b. Defining ethics
21788
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The moral will is self-determining, but the ethical will is met in society [Houlgate]
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22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
2705
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How can intuitionists distinguish universal convictions from local cultural ones? [Hare]
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2712
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You can't use intuitions to decide which intuitions you should cultivate [Hare]
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22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
2706
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Emotivists mistakenly think all disagreements are about facts, and so there are no moral reasons [Hare]
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22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / i. Prescriptivism
2855
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In primary evaluative words like 'ought' prescription is constant but description can vary [Hare, by Hooker,B]
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22331
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Moral statements are imperatives rather than the avowals of emotion - but universalisable [Hare, by Glock]
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22484
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Universalised prescriptivism could be seen as implying utilitarianism [Hare, by Foot]
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4125
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Hare says I acquire an agglomeration of preferences by role-reversal, leading to utilitarianism [Hare, by Williams,B]
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4126
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If we have to want the preferences of the many, we have to abandon our own deeply-held views [Williams,B on Hare]
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4127
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If morality is to be built on identification with the preferences of others, I must agree with their errors [Williams,B on Hare]
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2704
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If morality is just a natural or intuitive description, that leads to relativism [Hare]
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22483
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A judgement is presciptive if we expect it to be acted on [Hare]
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2703
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Descriptivism say ethical meaning is just truth-conditions; prescriptivism adds an evaluation [Hare]
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2707
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If there can be contradictory prescriptions, then reasoning must be involved [Hare]
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2708
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An 'ought' statement implies universal application [Hare]
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2711
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Prescriptivism implies a commitment, but descriptivism doesn't [Hare]
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2709
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Prescriptivism sees 'ought' statements as imperatives which are universalisable [Hare]
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