Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Zoroaster, Cardinal/Hayward/Jones and W. David Ross
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13 ideas
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good
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5921
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We can ask of pleasure or beauty whether they are valuable, but not of goodness [Ross]
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22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
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5932
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The four goods are: virtue, pleasure, just allocation of pleasure, and knowledge [Ross]
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5910
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The three intrinsic goods are virtue, knowledge and pleasure [Ross]
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22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / c. Right and good
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5898
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'Right' and 'good' differ in meaning, as in a 'right action' and a 'good man' [Ross]
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5899
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If there are two equally good acts, they may both be right, but neither a duty [Ross]
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5904
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In the past 'right' just meant what is conventionally accepted [Ross]
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5919
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Goodness is a wider concept than just correct ethical conduct [Ross]
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5941
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Motives decide whether an action is good, and what is done decides whether it was right [Ross]
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22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / d. Good as virtue
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5938
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Virtue is superior to pleasure, as pleasure is never a duty, but goodness is [Ross]
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22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / e. Good as knowledge
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5931
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All other things being equal, a universe with more understanding is better [Ross]
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5939
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Morality is not entirely social; a good moral character should love truth [Ross]
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22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / c. Value of pleasure
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5905
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We clearly value good character or understanding, as well as pleasure [Ross]
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5929
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No one thinks it doesn't matter whether pleasure is virtuously or viciously acquired [Ross]
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