display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
11 ideas
21871 | The more we strive for our own advantage, the more virtuous we are [Spinoza] |
Full Idea: The more each one strives, and is able, to seek his own advantage, that is, to preserve his being, the more he is endowed with virtue. | |
From: Baruch de Spinoza (The Ethics [1675], IV Pr 20) | |
A reaction: Beth Lord says this is his key ethical idea. Our conatus (striving) is the essence of our nature, and virtue is the perfect expression of our essence. Presumably the destruction of others in competition is also bad for us. |
17210 | All virtue is founded on self-preservation [Spinoza] |
Full Idea: The endeavour after self-preservation is the primary and only foundation of virtue. | |
From: Baruch de Spinoza (The Ethics [1675], IV Pr 22) | |
A reaction: This fits in perfectly with modern evolutionary ethics. |
17214 | To act virtuously is to act rationally [Spinoza] |
Full Idea: To act in conformity to virtue is to act according to the guidance of reason. | |
From: Baruch de Spinoza (The Ethics [1675], IV Pr 36) | |
A reaction: This Kantian ideal always seems to be missing foundational values or feelings. If something is judged to be rubbish, I throw it away. |
4856 | To live according to reason is to live according to the laws of human nature [Spinoza] |
Full Idea: Man acts absolutely according to the laws of his nature, when he lives in obedience to reason. | |
From: Baruch de Spinoza (The Ethics [1675], IV Pr 35) | |
A reaction: This is pure stoicism, and shows that Spinoza is in many ways the culmination of the seventeenth century stoic revival (e.g. in the art of Poussin). I love the idea that right reason and nature are in perfect harmony. I wonder why? |
17221 | A man ignorant of himself is ignorant of all of the virtues [Spinoza] |
Full Idea: The man who is ignorant of himself is ignorant of the foundation of all the virtues, and consequently is ignorant of all the virtues. | |
From: Baruch de Spinoza (The Ethics [1675], IV Pr 56) | |
A reaction: This would appeal to Aristotle, for whom the social virtues are an aspect of one's own character, and not a calculation made about externals. |
17225 | In a free man, choosing flight can show as much strength of mind as fighting [Spinoza] |
Full Idea: Flight at the proper time, just as well as fighting, is to be reckoned as showing strength of mind in a man who is free; that is to say, a free man chooses flight by the same strength or presence of mind as that by which he chooses battle. | |
From: Baruch de Spinoza (The Ethics [1675], IV Pr 69) | |
A reaction: I wonder why showing 'strength of mind' is a virtue? |
17218 | People who live according to reason should avoid pity [Spinoza] |
Full Idea: A man who lives according to the dictates of reason endeavours as much as possible to prevent himself from being touched by pity. | |
From: Baruch de Spinoza (The Ethics [1675], IV Pr 50) | |
A reaction: Since pity seems to give rise to some thoroughly good actions, I am not quite clear how reason would give rise to those same actions unaided. The alleviation of another's pain seems to have no pure motivation, if there is no empathy. |
17219 | A person unmoved by either reason or pity to help others is rightly called 'inhuman' [Spinoza] |
Full Idea: He who is moved neither by reason nor pity to be of any service to others is properly called inhuman; for he seems to be unlike a man. | |
From: Baruch de Spinoza (The Ethics [1675], IV Pr 50) | |
A reaction: Calling someone 'inhuman' doesn't seem like much of a condemnation. Nietzschean aristocrats may take pride in being above the mere 'human'. We gather here that if reason failed to motivate helping others, then pity would be a good thing. |
17223 | Pity is not a virtue, but at least it shows a desire to live uprightly [Spinoza] |
Full Idea: Pity, like shame, although it is not a virtue, is nevertheless good, in so far as it shows that a desire of living uprightly is present in the man who is possessed with shame. | |
From: Baruch de Spinoza (The Ethics [1675], IV Pr 58) | |
A reaction: And yet, in so far as I am rational, it seems that I should endeavour to suppress pity and replace it with right reason. Does Spinoza feel loyalty to the human race, I wonder? |
4857 | Pity is a bad and useless thing, as it is a pain, and rational people perform good deeds without it [Spinoza] |
Full Idea: Pity is a pain, and is therefore in itself bad; only at the dictation of reason are we able to perform any action, which we know for certain to be good; thus, in a man who lives under the guidance of reason, pity in itself is useless and bad. | |
From: Baruch de Spinoza (The Ethics [1675], IV Pr 50) | |
A reaction: This is the essence of both Kant's and Bentham's views. It is, however, unclear why a wholly rational and unfeeling person should be motivated to prevent other people's pain. It also don't think it follows that because it is painful it is bad. |
17228 | Rational people judge money by needs, and live contented with very little [Spinoza] |
Full Idea: Those who know the true use of money, and regulate the measure of wealth according to their needs, live contented with few things. | |
From: Baruch de Spinoza (The Ethics [1675], IVApp 29) | |
A reaction: Spinoza himself lived up to this, being incredibly austere in his personal life. |