18231
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Anaxagoras said a person would choose to be born to contemplate the ordered heavens [Anaxagoras]
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Full Idea:
When Anaxagoras was asked what it was for which a person would choose to be born rather than not, he said it would be to apprehend the heavens and the order in the whole universe.
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From:
Anaxagoras (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE], 1216), quoted by Aristotle - Eudemian Ethics 8 'Finality'
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A reaction:
[Anaxagoras, quoted by Aristotle, quoted by Korsgaard, quoted by me, and then quoted by you, perhaps]
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5077
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The modern idea of obligation seems to have lost the idea of an obligation 'to' something [Taylor,R]
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Full Idea:
In modern moral thinking, obligation is something every responsible person is supposed to have, but it is not an obligation to the state, or society, or humanity, or even to God. It is an obligation standing by itself.
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From:
Richard Taylor (Virtue Ethics: an Introduction [2002], Ch.12)
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A reaction:
This nicely pinpoints how some our moral attitudes are relics of religion. Taylor wants a return to virtue, but one could respond by opting for the social contract (with very clear obligations) or Kantian 'contractualism' (answering to rational beings).
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5066
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If we are made in God's image, pursuit of excellence is replaced by duty to obey God [Taylor,R]
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Full Idea:
Once people are declared to be images of God, just by virtue of minimal humanity, they have, therefore, no greater individual excellence to aspire to, and their purpose became one of obligation, that is, obedience to God's will.
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From:
Richard Taylor (Virtue Ethics: an Introduction [2002], Ch.2)
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A reaction:
An interesting and plausible historical analysis. There is a second motivation for the change, though, in Grotius's desire to develop a more legalistic morality, focusing on actions rather than character. Taylor's point is more interesting, though.
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