display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
9 ideas
21038 | Does consent create the obligation, or must there be some benefit? [Sandel] |
Full Idea: Legal thinkers have debated this question for a long time: can consent create an obligation on its own, or is some element of benefit or reliance required? | |
From: Michael J. Sandel (Justice: What's the right thing to do? [2009], 06) | |
A reaction: Clearly mere consent could be under some compulsion, either by the other party, or by some other forces. Keeping a deathbed promise usually brings no benefit, but is a matter of honour. Ah, honour! Can anyone remember what that is? |
21039 | Moral contracts involve both consent and reciprocity; making the deal, and keeping it [Sandel] |
Full Idea: Despite a tendency to read consent into moral claims, it is hard to make sense of our morality without acknowledging the independent weight of reciprocity. If my wife is unfaithful I have two different grounds of outrage: our promise, and my loyalty. | |
From: Michael J. Sandel (Justice: What's the right thing to do? [2009], 06) | |
A reaction: The point is that Hobbes and co over-simplify what a contract is. Compare a contract with a promise. One must be two-sided, the other can be one-sided. |
21036 | Not all deals are fair deals [Sandel] |
Full Idea: The mere fact that you and I make a deal is not enough to make it fair. | |
From: Michael J. Sandel (Justice: What's the right thing to do? [2009], 06) |
21030 | The categorical imperative is not the Golden Rule, which concerns contingent desires [Sandel] |
Full Idea: The Golden Rule depends on contingent facts about how people like to be treated. The categorical imperative asks that we abstract from such contingencies and respect persons as rational beings, regardless of what they might want in particular situations. | |
From: Michael J. Sandel (Justice: What's the right thing to do? [2009], 05) | |
A reaction: I think the Golden Rule is wrong for a different reason. It assumes that we all want similar things, which we don't. Focus on other people's needs, not yours. |
5123 | Maybe there is no such thing as character, and the virtues and vices said to accompany it [Harman] |
Full Idea: It may be the case that there is no such thing as character, no ordinary character traits of the sort people think there are, none of the usual moral virtues and vices. | |
From: Gilbert Harman (Moral Philosophy meets social psychology [1999], 10.1) | |
A reaction: This would be a devastating fact for virtue theory, if it were true. I don't believe it. He thinks patterns of behaviour result from circumstances, but we give accurate and detailed pictures of people's characters (esp. in novels). |
5124 | If a person's two acts of timidity have different explanations, they are not one character trait [Harman] |
Full Idea: If Herbert is disposed to not speak in history class (but not other subjects), and explanation of this is different from his avoidance of roller coaster rides, then these two dispositions are not special cases of a single character trait. | |
From: Gilbert Harman (Moral Philosophy meets social psychology [1999], 10.2) | |
A reaction: A basic Harman argument for denying the existence of character (and hence of virtues). I just say that character traits are more complex than his caricature of them. If I keep imagining disaster and humiliation for myself, that is a character trait. |
5125 | Virtue ethics might involve judgements about the virtues of actions, rather than character [Harman] |
Full Idea: There are variants of virtue ethics that do not require character traits in the ordinary sense. For example, moral thinking might be explicated by appeal to judgements about whether particular actions are just or courageous or whatever. | |
From: Gilbert Harman (Moral Philosophy meets social psychology [1999], 10.7.1.1) | |
A reaction: A very interesting proposal (from Judith Jarvis Thomson). This would flatly reject Aristotle, and one presumes that the judgement about the virtue of the action would largely be a matter of pondering cultural conventions (or, perhaps, consequences). |
22262 | Kant's moral law has no foundation - because that would undermine its priority [Sandel] |
Full Idea: Given the stringent demands of the Kantian ethic, the moral law would seem almost to require a foundation in nothing, for any empirical precondition would undermine its priority. | |
From: Michael J. Sandel (Procedural republic and unencumbered self [1984], 'Kantian') | |
A reaction: The idea of a value with 'a foundation in nothing' is particular anathema to me, because my project is to find a foundation for everything (in nature, which is the Given). Kant's only foundational value seems to be rational consistency. |
21031 | Man cannot dispose of himself, because he is not a thing to be owned [Sandel] |
Full Idea: Man cannot dispose over himself because he is not a thing; he is not his own property. | |
From: Michael J. Sandel (Justice: What's the right thing to do? [2009], 05) | |
A reaction: [Kant lecture note] This is an important qualification to persons as ends. If a person owned themselves, that would separate the person from what they owned. Sandel mentions selling your own organs. Kant is considering prostitution. Why is slavery wrong? |