display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
6 ideas
2169 | Greek moral progress came when 'virtue' was freed from social status [Williams,B] |
Full Idea: There was moral progress in the ancient Greek world, notably to the extent that the idea of areté, human excellence, was freed to some extent from determination by social position. | |
From: Bernard Williams (Shame and Necessity [1993], I - p.7) |
4112 | A crucial feature of moral thought is second-order desire - the desire to have certain desires [Williams,B] |
Full Idea: Recently there has been much emphasis on the importance of our capacity to have second-order desires - the desire to have certain desires - and its significance for ethical reflection and the practical consciousness. | |
From: Bernard Williams (Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy [1985], Ch. 1) | |
A reaction: This is a crucial point if we are to defend a reasonably rational view of morality against (say) emotivism. I agree that it is crucial to morality. |
24010 | An admirable human being should have certain kinds of emotional responses [Williams,B] |
Full Idea: One's conception of an admirable human being implies that he should be disposed to certain kinds of emotional response, and not to others. | |
From: Bernard Williams (Morality and the emotions [1965], p.225) | |
A reaction: So are the good emotions an indicator of being a good person, or is that what their goodness consists of? The goodness must be cashed out in actions, and presumably good emotions both promise good actions, and motivate them. |
23279 | It is important that a person can change their character, and not just be successive 'selves' [Williams,B] |
Full Idea: I want to emphasise the basic importance of the ordinary idea of a self or person which undergoes changes of character, as opposed to dissolving a changing person into a series of 'selves'. | |
From: Bernard Williams (Persons, Character and Morality [1976], II) | |
A reaction: [compressed] He mentions Derek Parfit for the rival view. Williams has the Aristotelian view, that a person has an essential nature, which endures through change, and explains that change. But that needs some non-essential character traits. |
23280 | Kantians have an poor account of individuals, and insist on impartiality, because they ignore character [Williams,B] |
Full Idea: The Kantians' omission of character is a condition of their ultimate insistence on the demands of impartial morality, just as it is a reason to find inadequate their account of the individual. | |
From: Bernard Williams (Persons, Character and Morality [1976], II) | |
A reaction: This is also why the Kantian account of virtue is inadequate, in comparison with the Aristotelian view. |
3236 | Equality of opportunity without equality of respect would create a very inhuman society [Williams,B] |
Full Idea: A highly rational, efficient and unmitigated application of the idea of equality of opportunity, while abandoning the idea of equality of respect as vague and nostalgic, would lead to a quite inhuman society. | |
From: Bernard Williams (The Idea of Equality [1962], §3) |