display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
14 ideas
4273 | Kant's Moral Law is the rules rational beings would accept when trying to live by agreement [Scruton] |
Full Idea: We can see the Kantian 'Moral Law' as consisting precisely in those rules which rational beings would accept, when attempting to live by agreement. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.30) | |
A reaction: If this combines Kantian notions of duty with the obligations of contracts, it is the core of a very powerful moral theory. See the work of Tim Scanlon. Classic problems are still the weak, animals and free riders. |
3896 | Any social theory of morality has the problem of the 'free rider', who only pretends to join in [Scruton] |
Full Idea: Any attempt to provide a social justification of morality runs the risk of the 'free rider' - one who pretends to play the game in order to enjoy the fruits of it. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey [1994], 20.6) |
4274 | The modern virtues are courage, prudence, wisdom, temperance, justice, charity and loyalty [Scruton] |
Full Idea: The antique virtues of courage, prudence, wisdom, temperance and justice, amplified by Christian charity and pagan loyalty, still form the core idea of human excellence. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.33) | |
A reaction: I always think sense of humour has become a key modern virtue. Where did that come from? Maybe a sense of irony is a good thing. How about efficiency (which is Plato's idea of justice!)? |
4286 | Only just people will drop their own self-interests when faced with an impartial verdict [Scruton] |
Full Idea: Only just people will act on the impartial verdict when their own interests conflict with it. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.61) | |
A reaction: The Kantian account of the virtues. Virtues are seen in the acceptance of a range of obvious human duties. Very helpful point if one is aiming for one unified theory of morality. |
4283 | Sympathy can undermine the moral order just as much as crime does [Scruton] |
Full Idea: A person who lives by sympathy may undermine the moral order as effectively as the one who lives by crime. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.54) | |
A reaction: A slightly chilling remark. Presumably one should not feel too much for suffering which is deserved. What about unavoidable suffering? It is certainly important to see that some suffering is morally good (e.g. grief or remorse). |
7589 | Altruism is either emotional (where your interests are mine) or moral (where they are reasons for me) [Scruton] |
Full Idea: Two distinct motives go by the name of altruism: the emotions of liking, love and friendship, making another's interest automatically mine; and the moral motive of respect or considerateness, where another's interests become reasons for me, but not mine. | |
From: Roger Scruton (A Dictionary of Political Thought [1982], 'altruism') | |
A reaction: The second one has a strongly Kantian flavour, with its notion of impersonal duty. Virtue theorists will aspire to achieve the first state rather than the second, because good actions are then actively desired, and give pleasure to the doer. |
3886 | Membership is the greatest source of obligation [Scruton] |
Full Idea: Membership is the greatest source of obligation. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey [1994], 11.2) | |
A reaction: An interesting and rather Aristotelian idea. The alternative is individual debt or obligation. |
4290 | That which can only be done by a callous person, ought not to be done [Scruton] |
Full Idea: That which can only be done by a callous person, ought not to be done. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.86) | |
A reaction: The problem cases all arise in wartime. Ideally we want to show sympathy even when being necessarily ruthless, but in practice we send the callous ones to do the horrible deed. |
4285 | As soon as we drop self-interest and judge impartially, we find ourselves agreeing about conflicts [Scruton] |
Full Idea: As soon as we set our own interests aside and look on human relations with the eye of the impartial judge, we find ourselves agreeing over the rights and wrongs of any conflict. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.59) | |
A reaction: A nice, and fairly plausible, defence of Kantian ethics. Maybe the UN should actually settle all disputes, instead of just peace-keeping. The idea merely describes the function of the law, and especially an independent judiciary. |
3895 | The categorical imperative is not just individual, but can be used for negotiations between strangers [Scruton] |
Full Idea: The categorical imperative is also an instrument of negotiation and compromise between strangers, through which they can rise out of enmity and confront each other as equals. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey [1994], 20.6) |
4287 | Utilitarianism merely guides us (by means of sympathy) when the moral law is silent [Scruton] |
Full Idea: Utilitarian thinking does not replace or compete with the moral law, but guides us when the moral law is silent and only sympathy speaks. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.63) | |
A reaction: If the moral law is silent, it is not quite clear why we should follow sympathy rather than contempt. There is the well-known danger here of the moral law turning out to lack content. |
4280 | Utilitarianism is wrong precisely because it can't distinguish animals from people [Scruton] |
Full Idea: It was precisely the inability of utilitarianism to explain the distinction between animals and people which led to its rejection. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.50) | |
A reaction: A nice turning of the tables, rejecting the utilitarian pride in incorporating animals into their theory where others (like Kant) reject them. Yet in one respect (suffering) they are inescapably very like us. |
4281 | Utilitarianism says we can't blame Stalin yet, but such a theory is a sick joke [Scruton] |
Full Idea: Stalin and Hitler justified their actions in utilitarian terms, ..and no one can accuse them, for who knows what the long-term effects of their actions might be? But a morality which can't pass final judgement on Hitler or Stalin is a kind of sick joke. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.52) | |
A reaction: A powerful argument against simplistic consequentialism. We can judge an action at any time, even beforehand, and that must be part of morality, which can't just observe the unfolding consequences. |
4282 | Morality is not a sort of calculation, it is what sets the limits to when calculation is appropriate [Scruton] |
Full Idea: It is nearer the truth to see morality as setting the limits to practical reasoning, rather than being a species of it. Moral principles tell us precisely that we must go no further along the path of calculation. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.52) | |
A reaction: Well said. If you are assessing whether an act of vicious brutality is required, you have probably already gone morally astray. It is not hard, though, to think of counterexamples, especially in wartime. |