Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Bernard Williams, Michael Tye and Arcesilaus
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25 ideas
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 3. Promise Keeping
4252
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Promise keeping increases reliability, by making deliberation focus on something which would be overlooked [Williams,B]
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23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 5. Free Rider
4116
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A weakness of contractual theories is the position of a person of superior ability and power [Williams,B]
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23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
2169
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Greek moral progress came when 'virtue' was freed from social status [Williams,B]
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23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
4112
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A crucial feature of moral thought is second-order desire - the desire to have certain desires [Williams,B]
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23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
24010
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An admirable human being should have certain kinds of emotional responses [Williams,B]
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23279
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It is important that a person can change their character, and not just be successive 'selves' [Williams,B]
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23280
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Kantians have an poor account of individuals, and insist on impartiality, because they ignore character [Williams,B]
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23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / h. Respect
3236
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Equality of opportunity without equality of respect would create a very inhuman society [Williams,B]
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23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 1. Deontology
4113
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'Deon' in Greek means what one must do; there was no word meaning 'duty' [Williams,B]
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23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
4250
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The concept of a 'duty to myself' is fraudulent [Williams,B]
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4110
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Obligation and duty look backwards (because of a promise or job), although the acts are in the future [Williams,B]
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4249
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"Ought implies can" is a famous formula in connection with moral obligation [Williams,B]
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2172
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The modern idea of duty is unknown in archaic Greece [Williams,B]
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4248
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Not all moral deliberations lead to obligations; some merely reveal what 'may' be done [Williams,B]
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23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability
4121
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Why should I think of myself as both the legislator and the citizen who follows the laws? [Williams,B]
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22409
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We don't have a duty to ensure that others do their duty [Williams,B]
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4122
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If the self becomes completely impartial, it no longer has enough identity to worry about its interests [Williams,B]
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23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 6. Motivation for Duty
2180
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If reason cannot lead people to good, we must hope they have an internal voice [Williams,B]
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24012
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Kant's love of consistency is too rigid, and it even overrides normal fairness [Williams,B]
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2179
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If the moral self is seen as characterless, then other people have a very limited role in our moral lives [Williams,B]
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23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
22407
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Utilitarianism cannot make any serious sense of integrity [Williams,B]
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23278
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For utilitarians states of affairs are what have value, not matter who produced them [Williams,B]
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23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 3. Motivation for Altruism
4124
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Utilitarian benevolence involves no particular attachments, and is immune to the inverse square law [Williams,B]
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23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 7. Existential Action
4245
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Ethical conviction must be to some extent passive, and can't just depend on the will and decisions [Williams,B]
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4246
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Taking responsibility won't cure ethical uncertainty by; we are uncertain what to decide [Williams,B]
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