display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
33 ideas
| 19961 | Primitive people would be too vulnerable and timid to attack anyone, so peace would reign [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: A being concerned only with preservation would be very timid. In such a state every man would feel himself an inferior; he could scarcely imagine himself an equal. No one would seek to attack anyone else; peace would be the first law of nature. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 01.02) | |
| A reaction: Exactly the idea that Rousseau took up, and they both attack Hobbes for describing a more advanced stage of society, instead of focusing on the original state. A solitary individual would be crazy to launch attacks on other individuals. |
| 19962 | Men do not desire to subjugate one another; domination is a complex and advanced idea [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: It is unreasonable to impute to men, as Hobbes does, the desire to subjugate one another. The idea of sovereignty [l'empire] and domination is so complex and depends on so many other ideas, that it could not be the first to occur to men. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 01.02) |
| 19963 | People are drawn into society by needs, shared fears, pleasure, and knowledge [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: To his sense of weakness, man would soon add his needs. Encouraged by indications that their fear was shared, men would soon come together. They would feel the pleasure (and sexual attraction) of their own species. Knowledge then draws them into society. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 01.02) | |
| A reaction: He doesn't make the point about 'knowledge' very clear. |
| 20008 | People are guided by a multitude of influences, from which the spirit of a nation emerges [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: Men are ruled by many causes: climate, religion, laws, maxims of government, examples drawn from the pasts, customs, manners. Out of them is formed the general spirit of a nation. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 19.04) | |
| A reaction: This is one step away from Rousseau's general will, which is an attempt to give precise expression to this 'spirit of a nation'. |
| 19993 | In small republics citizens identify with the public good, and abuses are fewer [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: In a small republic, the public good is more keenly felt, better known, closer to every citizen; abuses are spread less widely, and consequently, are less tolerated. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 08.16) | |
| A reaction: This idea of very small republics now seems outdated, but this idea still applies. Small states like the Baltic States (or Scotland?) have a better chance of the citizens identifying with the whole community. |
| 19992 | In a large republic there is too much wealth for individuals to manage it [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: In a large republic, there are large fortunes, and therefore but little moderation in the minds of men. its resources are too considerable to be entrusted to a citizen. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 08.16) |
| 20005 | The rich would never submit to a lottery deciding which part of their society should be slaves [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: I do not believe that anyone of [that small part of a nation that is rich and voluptuous] would submit to a lottery determining which part of the nation would be free, and which slave. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 15.09) | |
| A reaction: Wonderful! This is exactly Rawls's 'initial position' and 'veil of ignorance'. It is used here to deconstruct implausible arguments in favour of slavery. |
| 19995 | All states aim at preservation, and then have distinctive individual purposes [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: Although all states share the same general objective, to preserve themselves, each has its own particular purpose (such as aggrandisement, war, religion, commerce, tranquillity, navigation, liberty, pleasures of the ruler, glory, individual independence). | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 11.05) | |
| A reaction: [he gives examples for each of the list in brackets] I'm trying to think of the distinctive purpose of the UK, and can't get beyond sport, music gigs and comedy shows. |
| 19964 | The natural power of a father suggests rule by one person, but that authority can be spread [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: Some have thought that because nature has established the power of the parent, the most natural government is that of a single person. But the example of paternal power proves nothing. The inheritance by a father's brothers would support rule by the many. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 01.03) | |
| A reaction: [last bit compressed] Locke pointed out that the mother has similar entitlement, and he and Rousseau agree in rejecting this idea. |
| 19986 | Monarchies can act more quickly, because one person is in charge [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: Monarchical government has the great advantage that, since public business is guided by a single person, the executive power can operate more speedily. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 05.10) | |
| A reaction: Liberal democracies are particularly hopeless at quick action, because so many views have to be heard. |
| 19972 | The nobility are an indispensable part of a monarchy [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: In a sense, nobility is one part of the essence of monarchy, whose fundamenta maxim is: 'without a monarchy, no nobility; without a nobility, no monarchy'. There are, of course, despots, but they are something else. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 02.04) | |
| A reaction: Hence the worst vice associated with a monarchy is patronage, even when the monarch is weak and 'constitutional'. |
| 19974 | Monarchs must not just have links to the people; they need a body which maintains the laws [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: In a monarchy, it is not enough to have intermediary ranks; there must also be a body that is a depositary of laws. They must announce the laws when they are made, and recall them to the public's attention when they are forgotten. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 02.04) | |
| A reaction: This is the crucial difference between a monarch and a despot, because the monarch must be subservient to the law. |
| 19976 | Ambition is good in a monarchy, because the monarch can always restrain it [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: In a republic ambition is pernicious, but in a monarchy it has a good effect; it gives life to that type of government. Its advantage lies in that it is not dangerous, because a monarchy can continue to restrain it. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 03.07) | |
| A reaction: That is sometimes offered as a defence of the very weak British monarchy. |
| 19978 | In monarchies, men's actions are judged by their grand appearance, not their virtues [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: In monarchies, men's actions are judged, not by whether they are good, but whether they appear attractive [belles]; not by whether they are just, but whether they appear grand; not by whether they are reasonable, but by whether they appear extraordinary. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 04.02) | |
| A reaction: A person that comes to mind is the Duke of Buckingham under James I and Charles I. Or the Earl of Essex under Elizabeth I. |
| 19985 | In a monarchy, the nobility must be hereditary, to bind them together [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: In a monarchy, the laws must make the nobility hereditary, not to serve as the boundary between the power of the ruler and the weakness of the people, but as the tie that binds them together.... | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 05.09) | |
| A reaction: This seems rather disingenuous. If the nobility are bound together in some tight manner, this immediately serves as a sharp boundary between them and the rest of the people. Monarchs are bound to want the strict boundary. |
| 19988 | A despot's agents must be given power, so they inevitably become corrupt [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: A government cannot be unjust without putting some power in the hands of its agents; it is impossible that they not profit from their position. Embezzlement is, therefore, natural to such governments. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 05.15) |
| 19977 | Despotism and honour are incompatible, because honour scorns his power, and lives by rules [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: How could a despot permit honour? Honour depends upon scorning life; the despot has power only because he can deprive men of life. How could honour tolerate the despot? Honour has fixed rules, ...but the despot has no rule. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 03.08) | |
| A reaction: The old German aristocracy seem to have been utterly alienated and isolated by the Nazi regime. |
| 20007 | Tyranny is either real violence, or the imposition of unpopular legislation [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: There are two sorts of tyranny: that which is real and consists of the violence of government; and the tyranny of opinion, when those who govern institute things contrary to a nation's mode of thought. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 19.03) | |
| A reaction: By this reckoning the abolition of the death penalty by the UK partliament was tyrannous, as it went against popular enthusiasm for it. Representative democracy is always in danger of drifting towards mild tyranny. |
| 19975 | Despots are always lazy and ignorant, so they always delegate their power to a vizier [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: Anyone whom his senses inform continually that he is everything, and others nothing, is naturally lazy, voluptuous, and ignorant. Hence the establishment of a vizier, with power the same as his own, is a law fundamental to a despotic state. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 02.05) |
| 19989 | The will of a despot is an enigma, so magistrates can only follow their own will [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: Under despotism, the law is nothing more than the will of the ruler. Even if the despot were wise, how could a magistrate follow a will unknown to him? He has no choice but to follow his own. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 05.16) |
| 19970 | If the nobility is numerous, the senate is the artistocracy, and the nobles are a democracy [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: When the nobility is numerous, there must be a senate to regulate those matters which the body of nobles is incapable of deciding. Thus aristocracy of a kind resides in the senate, democracy in the body of nobles, while the people is nothing. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 02.03) | |
| A reaction: This presumes that the body of nobles elects the senate. |
| 19971 | Aristocracy is democratic if they resemble the people, but not if they resemble the monarch [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: Aristocratic families ought to be, as much as possible, members of the people. The more an aristocracy resembles a democracy, the more perfect it is; the more it resembles a monarchy, the more imperfect. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 02.03) | |
| A reaction: Aristocrats far from the big cities seem remarkably like the rest of the people. As soon as they approach the monarch's court, they aspire to dignity and power, and begin to spurn the citizens. |
| 19984 | Great inequality between aristocrats and the rest is bad - and also among aristocrats themselves [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: In aristocratic state there are two main sources of disorders: excessive inequality between those who govern and those who are governed, and the same degree of inequality among the different members of the ruling group [corps]. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 05.08) | |
| A reaction: This sounds like a very historically accurate observation, since aristocrats are always at one another's throats. But maybe junior aristocrats just need to be kept more firmly in their place. |
| 19980 | If a government is to be preserved, it must first be loved [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: Government is like everything else in this world: if it is to be preserved, it must first be loved. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 04.05) | |
| A reaction: Nice one! Right now there seems to be a declining love for representative democracy, even though almost everyone endorses it. |
| 19996 | A government has a legislature, an international executive, and a domestic executive [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: In every government there are three sorts of powers: the legislative; the executivem in regard to those matters determined by the laws of nations; and the executive, in regard to those matters determined by civil law. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 11.06) |
| 19997 | The judiciary must be separate from the legislature, to avoid arbitrary power [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: Were the judicial power joined to the legislative, the life and liberty of the citizens would be subject to arbitrary power. For the judge would then be the legislator. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 11.06) | |
| A reaction: This is the key 'separation of powers', which seems to be a mantra for nearly all theories of the state. |
| 19965 | The fundamental laws of a democracy decide who can vote [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: The laws fundamental to a democracy are those that establish who is eligible to vote. (p.118 No less fundamental is the method of voting itself). | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 02.02) | |
| A reaction: Tricky groups now are teenagers, convicted criminals, people with damaged brains, and citizens who live abroad. Maybe people who evade paying tax should lose the right to vote. |
| 19968 | It is basic to a democracy that the people themselves must name their ministers [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: A democratic people may be said to have ministers only when these have been named by the people itself. Thus it is a maxim fundamental to this type of government that the people must name its ministers. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 02.02) | |
| A reaction: In the UK we don't do this. We elect local representatives, usually of a preferred party, and then they chose the ministers, and even the leader. The people who run our country are a long way from direct democracy. |
| 19969 | Voting should be public, so the lower classes can be influenced by the example of notable people [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: When the people votes it should do so in public. ...For it is necessary that the lower classes be enlightened by those of higher rank, that the precipitous qualities of the lower classes be held in check by the grave example of certain notables. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 02.02) | |
| A reaction: This sounds shocking to us, but the lower classes were largely illiterate. Nowadays we have television to tell us how the notables are going to vote, and the less notables seem to be increasingly unimpressed. |
| 19999 | All citizens (apart from the very humble poor) should choose their representatives [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: All citizens ought to have the right to choose their representatives by election. The only exception concerns those whose condition is so base that they are considered to have no will of their own. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 11.06) | |
| A reaction: This is an amazingly liberal view of the franchise for its time (though he may not be including women), but with a rather breathtaking coda! It may be hard for us now to grasp the very humble state of an illiterate peasant. |
| 19967 | In a democracy the people should manage themselves, and only delegate what they can't do [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: In a democracy, the people, which holds the sovereign power, ought itself to do everything it can do well; that which it cannot do well must be done by its ministers. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 02.02) | |
| A reaction: This is just what you see when a group of residents manages their own building. Citizens in representative democracies become utterly lazy about running their society, so that they won't even pick up litter, or report communal problems. |
| 19966 | A democratic assembly must have a fixed number, to see whether everyone has spoken [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: It is essential to fix the number of citizens who can participate in assemblies. Otherwise it would be uncertain whether all the people had spoken, or only a part of it. At Sparta the number was fixed at ten thousand. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 02.02) | |
| A reaction: This looks like an immediate injustice to the citizen who came 10,001 in the rankings. 10,000 is just a smallish football crowd, so we could manage it today. We could pick the 10,000 by sortition (by lot). Most people are fairly sensible! |
| 19998 | If deputies represent people, they are accountable, but less so if they represent places [Montesquieu] |
| Full Idea: When the deputies represent the body or estate of the people, as in Holland, they ought to be accountable to their constituents. When the deputies represent boroughs, as in England, the situation is not the same. | |
| From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 11.06) | |
| A reaction: Not sure how this works. Modern UK MPs are accountable to the residents of their borough. Did the Dutch actually name the citizens that a deputy represented? |