display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
24 ideas
4680 | Autonomy seems to acquire greater weight when the decision is more important to a person [Glover] |
Full Idea: The appeal to autonomy has much more force where the person's decision is of great importance to them (as in suicide), than it has when it concerns a lesser decision (such as whether to wear a seatbelt). | |
From: Jonathan Glover (Causing Death and Saving Lives [1977], §13.5) | |
A reaction: This is presumably uncontroversial. Planning regulations show the intrusiveness on an individual is crucial. I trim your hedge, or your hair, or your tonsils, or your beliefs… |
4670 | Being alive is not intrinsically good, and there is no 'right to life' [Glover] |
Full Idea: There is nothing intrinsically good in a person being alive, and the idea of a 'right to life' should be rejected. | |
From: Jonathan Glover (Causing Death and Saving Lives [1977], §11.1) | |
A reaction: If pleasure or benefit can be intrinsically good, I don't see why life can't be. The notion of a 'natural' or 'self-evident' right does look dubious to me. Rights are earned and given. Robinson Crusoe has no rights. |
4668 | You can't have a right to something you can't desire, so a foetus has no 'right' to life [Glover] |
Full Idea: It seems that the bearers of rights must at least have the capacity to desire what they have a right to, which is something the foetus does not have. | |
From: Jonathan Glover (Causing Death and Saving Lives [1977], §9.4) | |
A reaction: Obviously we could say a person has a right to something they don't desire (such as freedom). How about: a mental defective has the right not to be laughed at, even if they don't understand the mockery? |
7810 | The 'Eumenides' of Aeschylus shows blood feuds replaced by law [Aeschylus, by Grayling] |
Full Idea: The 'Eumenides' of Aeschylus tells how the old rule of revenge and blood feud was replaced by a due process of law before a civil jury. | |
From: report of Aeschylus (The Eumenides [c.458 BCE]) by A.C. Grayling - What is Good? Ch.2 | |
A reaction: Compare Idea 1659, where this revolution is attributed to Protagoras (a little later than Aeschylus). I take the rule of law and of society to be above all the rule of reason, because the aim is calm objectivity instead of emotion. |
4651 | Utilitarians object to killing directly (pain, and lost happiness), and to side-effects (loss to others, and precedents) [Glover] |
Full Idea: Utilitarians have two direct objections to killing (the fear and pain, and the loss of future happiness), and two concerns about side-effects (the loss to friends and community, and the bad precedent and public anxiety caused). | |
From: Jonathan Glover (Causing Death and Saving Lives [1977], §4.4) | |
A reaction: This invites obvious counterexamples, of somewhat unhappy, lonely people, who can be quietly killed with no qualms. Who will be callous enough to do this deed for us? |
4671 | What is wrong with killing someone, if another equally worthwhile life is substituted? [Glover] |
Full Idea: If the only objection to killing (or not conceiving) is the impersonal one of not reducing the amount of worthwhile life, there seems nothing wrong with eliminating one worthwhile life if another is substituted. | |
From: Jonathan Glover (Causing Death and Saving Lives [1977], §11.1) | |
A reaction: This invites us to value a life in itself, rather than for what it makes possible (e.g. 'worthwhile' activity). It doesn't follow that the life is 'sacred' - only that it has some intrinsic value. And why not? |
4676 | The 'no trade-off' position: killing is only justified if it prevents other deaths [Glover] |
Full Idea: The 'no trade-off' position: killing may be justified if it prevents other deaths, but not in defence of the quality of other lives, or by the miserable life of the person killed. | |
From: Jonathan Glover (Causing Death and Saving Lives [1977], §12.2) | |
A reaction: As a utilitarian, Glover opposes this, since death is not the only source of unhappiness. Would we (if necessary) kill a terrorist who was burning down all our art galleries or churches? I would, if it was the only way. |
4685 | Societies spend a lot to save known persons, but very little to reduce fatal accidents [Glover] |
Full Idea: There is often a big discrepancy between what a society will spend on saving the life of a known person in peril, and what it will spend to reduce the future level of fatal accidents. | |
From: Jonathan Glover (Causing Death and Saving Lives [1977], §16.3) | |
A reaction: This is a good point in favour of utilitarian approaches, which ask for impersonal calculation (which presumably embody an ideal of justice, buried somewhere in utilitarianism). But it isn't just 'sentimentality'. |
4649 | If someone's life is 'worth living', that gives one direct reason not to kill him [Glover] |
Full Idea: I am arguing that, if someone's life is worth living, this is one reason why it is directly wrong to kill him. | |
From: Jonathan Glover (Causing Death and Saving Lives [1977], §3.7) | |
A reaction: This is an attempt to find a modern utilitarian criterion of value. A problem case would be someone for whom only sadism made their life worth living. |
4683 | Involuntary euthanasia is wrong because it violates autonomy, and it has appalling side-effects [Glover] |
Full Idea: Involuntary euthanasia can normally be ruled out, because it falls foul of the autonomy objection, and it is likely to have appalling side-effects. | |
From: Jonathan Glover (Causing Death and Saving Lives [1977], §15.1) | |
A reaction: The only defence of it is if the prospects are utterly horrible and the subject cannot grasp them. However, is this true of children or the very old. Paternalism may be appropriate, if the decider has reliably depressing knowledge? |
4682 | Euthanasia is voluntary (patient's wish), or involuntary (ignore wish), or non-voluntary (no wish possible) [Glover] |
Full Idea: Voluntary euthanasia is done at the request of the person themselves. Involuntary euthanasia is killing someone in their own interests, but disregarding views they could express. Non-voluntary euthanasia is killing someone who cannot express any views. | |
From: Jonathan Glover (Causing Death and Saving Lives [1977], §15.1) | |
A reaction: Seems a clear and satisfactory distinction, despite the possibility of borderline cases. A look of pain on a face? An inarticulate person? Deliberate ambiguity? Misunderstanding? |
4684 | Maybe extreme treatment is not saving life, but prolonging the act of dying [Glover] |
Full Idea: It is often suggested that medical intervention which goes beyond easing pain or distress is not saving life but 'prolonging the act of dying'. | |
From: Jonathan Glover (Causing Death and Saving Lives [1977], §15.6) | |
A reaction: This is an important idea to keep in mind, but still a very difficult call to make. It needs to be presented to those who fight for life, at any cost in money, time, medical resources, or suffering. May people probably give up unnecessarily. |
4681 | The Nazi mass murders seem to have originated in their euthanasia programme [Glover] |
Full Idea: It is argued that the mass murders of the Nazi period had their small beginnings in the Nazi euthanasia programme. | |
From: Jonathan Glover (Causing Death and Saving Lives [1977], §14.2) | |
A reaction: This is the 'slippery slope' problem, and it seems undeniable that killing gets easier as you do more of it (e.g. on a farm). But not all slopes are slippery, if the focus is retained on reasons and justifications. |
4665 | Conception isn't the fixed boundary for a person's beginning, because twins are possible within two weeks [Glover] |
Full Idea: It is suggested that conception cannot be the boundary for the beginning of a genetic person, because monozygotic twins can split at any time during the first two weeks. | |
From: Jonathan Glover (Causing Death and Saving Lives [1977], §9.3) | |
A reaction: Interesting, but not convincing. If I suddenly learned that I could fission into twins tomorrow, I would be no less of a single person today. |
4652 | If killing is wrong because it destroys future happiness, not conceiving a happy child is also wrong [Glover] |
Full Idea: The main utilitarian objection to killing (that it results in the loss of future years of happiness) seems an equally powerful objection to deliberately not conceiving a happy child. | |
From: Jonathan Glover (Causing Death and Saving Lives [1977], §4.4) | |
A reaction: This makes perfect sense, unless you give intrinsic value to existing lives, but none at all to potential lives. Virtue ethics helps here, but genetic engineering is a nightmare for Aristotle. |
4662 | Defenders of abortion focus on early pregnancy, while opponents focus on later stages [Glover] |
Full Idea: Defenders of at least some abortions tend to focus on the early stages of pregnancy, when an embryo is very different from a baby, while opponents tend to focus on the later stages of pregnancy, when abortion resembles infanticide. | |
From: Jonathan Glover (Causing Death and Saving Lives [1977], §9) | |
A reaction: Seems true. If we ask which part of pregnancy we should focus on, the only plausible picture seems to be 'all of it', despite the confusing picture which results. |
4663 | If abortion is wrong, it is because a foetus is a human being or a person (or potentially so) [Glover] |
Full Idea: The case against abortion rests either on the claim that the foetus is a human being (or a potential human being), or on the different claim that the foetus is a person (or potential person). | |
From: Jonathan Glover (Causing Death and Saving Lives [1977], §9) | |
A reaction: The obvious problem with 'potential' is that every time Jack meets Jill there is a potential birth. And an early foetus is barely human, and clearly not a person. |
4664 | If abortion is wrong because of the 'potential' person, that makes contraception wrong too [Glover] |
Full Idea: It is hard to see how the 'potential' argument can succeed against abortion without also succeeding against contraception. | |
From: Jonathan Glover (Causing Death and Saving Lives [1977], §9.2) | |
A reaction: It would even make it wrong not to introduce a given man to a given woman, if you thought they might be attracted! Maybe 'incipient' would be a better word than 'potential'? A person has been 'initiated'? Do words matter that much? |
4673 | Abortion differs morally from deliberate non-conception only in its side-effects [Glover] |
Full Idea: Abortion differs morally from deliberate non-conception only in its side-effects. | |
From: Jonathan Glover (Causing Death and Saving Lives [1977], §11.4) | |
A reaction: This conclusion follows from a denial of any intrinsic value to a foetus, which in turns seems to imply that an adult human has no intrinsic value. Something must have intrinsic value, or nothing has any value at all. |
4666 | If viability is a test or boundary at the beginning of life, it should also be so for frail old people [Glover] |
Full Idea: Supporters of the theory that 'viability' is the boundary at one end of life have to explain why it is not equally relevant at the other end. | |
From: Jonathan Glover (Causing Death and Saving Lives [1977], §9.3) | |
A reaction: A very nice problem for what looks at first like an intuitively good test. Someone dependent on a dialysis machine is not 'viable'. Before modern medicine, this objection was much less forceful. But I'm not 'viable' if I have to be fed. |
4672 | Apart from side effects, it seems best to replace an inadequate foetus with one which has a better chance [Glover] |
Full Idea: If a foetus or baby has a poor chance of a worthwhile life, it may be directly wrong not to replace it by a baby with a better chance - though this consideration may be outweighed by side-effects. | |
From: Jonathan Glover (Causing Death and Saving Lives [1977], §11.1) | |
A reaction: I can't disagree with this. In early pregnancy, if we object to termination, why can't we object if the more 'worthwhile' child is not conceived. We want good human lives. |
4674 | It is always right for a qualified person to perform an abortion when requested by the mother [Glover] |
Full Idea: I think it is always right for a qualified person capable of performing an abortion to do so when requested by the mother. | |
From: Jonathan Glover (Causing Death and Saving Lives [1977], §11.4) | |
A reaction: There seems to be a question if the father is vehemently opposed. Glover concedes the right of a doctor to refuse. What if it is late in pregnancy, the baby will be instantly adopted, and the mother's motive seems malicious? |
4667 | How would we judge abortion if mothers had transparent wombs? [Glover] |
Full Idea: How would we react to abortion if mothers had transparent wombs, so that foetuses were visible? | |
From: Jonathan Glover (Causing Death and Saving Lives [1977], §9.3) | |
A reaction: Nice. Ultrasound scans have done this. The feeling of 'quickening' has always made a difference. Should these empathies affect our judgements? |
4679 | One test for a worthwhile life is to assess the amount of life for which you would rather be unconscious [Glover] |
Full Idea: One test for a worthwhile life is to assess the amount of life for which you would rather be unconscious. | |
From: Jonathan Glover (Causing Death and Saving Lives [1977], §13.2) | |
A reaction: A nicely chilling question. Enthusiasts want never to sleep. If I would prefer to be unconscious 20 hours every day (for a long period), there doesn't seem much point, does there? |