display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
5 ideas
20277 | Equality of interests is a minimal principle, not implying equal treatment [Singer] |
Full Idea: Equal consideration of interests is a minimal principle of equality in the sense that it does not dictate equal treatment. | |
From: Peter Singer (Practical Ethics [1979], 02) | |
A reaction: Do those convicted of serious crime retain equal interests? Should a huge group of people sacrifice all of their interests, because of the powerful interests of one person? |
20279 | Equality of opportunity unfairly rewards those lucky enough to have great ability [Singer] |
Full Idea: Equality of opportunity is not an attractive ideal. It rewards the lucky, who inherit those abilities that allow them to pursue interesting and lucrative careers. | |
From: Peter Singer (Practical Ethics [1979], 02) | |
A reaction: He makes it sound like cheating. Singer has a highly individualistic view, but society as a whole needs the development of talent, wherever it can be found. |
20285 | If a right entails having the relevant desire, many creatures might have no right to life [Singer] |
Full Idea: If to have a right one must have the ability to desire that to which one has a right, then to have a right to life one must be able to desire one's own continued existence. | |
From: Peter Singer (Practical Ethics [1979], 07) | |
A reaction: The unborn, small infants, and persons in comas may well lack the relevant desire (at least consciously - arguably even a plant has a non-conscious 'desire' or drive for life). The idea that a right entails a conscious desire seems daft. |
20284 | Why should a potential person have the rights of an actual person? [Singer] |
Full Idea: A prince may be a potential king, but he does not have the rights of a king. Why should a potential person have the rights of a person? | |
From: Peter Singer (Practical Ethics [1979], 06) | |
A reaction: But the prince is probably accorded special rights, merely on the grounds that he is the potential king. An unborn potential king is always considered as special. |
20283 | Killing a chimp is worse than killing a human too defective to be a person [Singer] |
Full Idea: It seems that killing a chimpanzee is worse than the killing of a gravely defective human who is not a person. ...[p.103] the effects on relatives of the defective human will sometimes constitute additional indirect reasons against killing the human. | |
From: Peter Singer (Practical Ethics [1979], 05) | |
A reaction: Singer's most notorious idea. Perhaps we should all carry cards (perhaps combined with donor cards) saying how many people will care if we die. |