display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
17 ideas
| 19858 | No one should be molested for their opinions, if they do not disturb the established order [Mirabeau/committee] |
| Full Idea: No man is to be molested on account of his opinions, even his religious opinions, provided that their manifestation does not disturb the public order established by law. | |
| From: Mirabeau and committee (Declaration of the Rights of Man [1789], 10) | |
| A reaction: Virtually any opinion will 'disturb' the established order a little bit, so this gives the option of suppressing quite mild beliefs, on the grounds of their small disturbance. It is still a wonderful proposal, though. |
| 19859 | Free speech is very precious, and everyone may speak and write freely (but take responsibility for it) [Mirabeau/committee] |
| Full Idea: The free communication of thoughts and opinions is one of man's most precious rights. Every citizen may therefore speak, write, and publish freely; except that he shall be responsible for the abuse of that freedom in cases determined by law. | |
| From: Mirabeau and committee (Declaration of the Rights of Man [1789], 11) | |
| A reaction: Wonderful, and very nicely expressed. Tom Paine will have been a huge influence on this clause. |
| 20524 | Market prices indicate shortages and gluts, and where the profits are to be made [Wolff,J] |
| Full Idea: The price system is a way of signalling and transmitting information. The fact that the price of a good rises shows that the good is in short supply. And if prices rise in a sector because of increasing demand, then new producers rush in for the profits. | |
| From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 5 'Free') | |
| A reaction: [Woff is discussing Hayek] Why do we have a shortage of decent housing in the UK? Centralised economies lack this direct way of discovering where their efforts should be directed. |
| 20518 | Liberty principles can't justify laws against duelling, incest between siblings and euthanasia [Wolff,J] |
| Full Idea: Many laws of contemporary society are very hard to defend in terms of Mill's Liberty Principle, such as laws against duelling, incest between siblings, and euthanasia. | |
| From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 4 'Poison') | |
| A reaction: [He cites Chief Justice Lord Devlin for this] Being killed in a duel can cause widespread misery. Fear of inbreeding is behind the second one, and fear of murdering the old behind the third one. No man is an island. |
| 20531 | Either Difference allows unequal liberty, or Liberty makes implementing Difference impossible [Wolff,J] |
| Full Idea: Critics say that the Difference Principle allows inequality of liberty ...and (more often) that liberty means we cannot impose any restriction on individual property holdings. | |
| From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 5 'Nozick') | |
| A reaction: The second objection is associated with Robert Nozick. The point is that you can implement the Difference Principle without restricting liberty. The standard right-wing objection of social welfare. |
| 20526 | Utilitarians argue for equal distribution because of diminishing utility of repetition [Wolff,J] |
| Full Idea: The utilitarian argument for equality assumes that people have 'diminishing marginal returns' for goods. If there are two people and two nice chocolate biscuits, then utilitarianism is likely to recommend one each. | |
| From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 5 'Arguments') | |
| A reaction: The point is that the second biscuit provides slightly diminished pleasure. This is why you can buy boxes of assorted biscuits, which you are then not required to share. |
| 20528 | Difference Principle: all inequalities should be in favour of the disadvantaged [Wolff,J] |
| Full Idea: Difference Principle: Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged. | |
| From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 5 'Choosing') | |
| A reaction: Rivals would say that inequalities should go to those who have earned them. |
| 19857 | All citizens are eligible for roles in the state, purely on the basis of merit [Mirabeau/committee] |
| Full Idea: All citizens being equal in the eyes of the law are equally eligible to all honours, offices, and public employments, according to their abilities and without other distinction than that of their virtues and talents. | |
| From: Mirabeau and committee (Declaration of the Rights of Man [1789], 06) | |
| A reaction: This proclamation of meritocracy must have rung bells around the cities of Europe, and was a reason why many people enjoyed being invaded by Napoleon. |
| 20503 | Political equality is not much use without social equality [Wolff,J] |
| Full Idea: As Marx observed, and as women have learnt to their cost, equal political rights are worth fighting for, but they are of little value if one is still treated unequally in day-to-day life. | |
| From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 3 'Participatory') | |
| A reaction: In fact social equality comes first, because that will imply political equality and financial justice. I think it is all covered under the virtue of 'respect', which should have pre-eminence in both public and private life. |
| 20512 | Standard rights: life, free speech, assembly, movement, vote, stand (plus shelter, food, health?) [Wolff,J] |
| Full Idea: The normal liberal basic rights are right to life, free speech, free assembly and freedom of movement, plus the rights to vote and stand for office. Some theorists add the right to a decent living standard (shelter, food and health care). | |
| From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 4 'Liberty') | |
| A reaction: I think he has forgotten to add education. In Britain Beatrice Webb seems to have single-handedly added the living standard group to the list. |
| 20513 | If natural rights are axiomatic, there is then no way we can defend them [Wolff,J] |
| Full Idea: The theory of basic natural rights is problematic, because although the theory is rigorous and principled, the disadvantage is that we are left with nothing more fundamental to say in defence of these rights. | |
| From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 4 'Liberty') | |
| A reaction: This is a nice point about anything which is treated as axiomatic - even Euclid's geometry. Presumably rights can only be justified by the needs of our shared human nature. |
| 20514 | If rights are natural, rather than inferred, how do we know which rights we have? [Wolff,J] |
| Full Idea: If natural rights have a fundamental status, and so are not arrived at on the basis of some other argument, how do we know what rights we have? | |
| From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 4 'Liberty') | |
| A reaction: He cites Bentham as using this point. Utilitarianism at least provides a grounding for the identification of possible basic rights. Start from what we want, or what we more objectively need? Human needs, or needs in our present culture? |
| 19862 | Property is a sacred right, breached only when essential, and with fair compensation [Mirabeau/committee] |
| Full Idea: Since property is an inviolable and sacred right, no man may be deprived of it except when public necessity, lawfully constituted, evidently requires it; and on condition that a just indemnity be paid in advance. | |
| From: Mirabeau and committee (Declaration of the Rights of Man [1789], 17) | |
| A reaction: This covers compulsory purchase orders. Is the ownership of slaves inviolable? Will aristocrats be compensated for the confiscation of their vast estates? |
| 20522 | Utilitarians might say property ownership encourages the best use of the land [Wolff,J] |
| Full Idea: A utilitarian justification of property rights says allowing people to appropriate property, trade in it, and leave it to their descendants will encourage them to make the most productive use of their resources. | |
| From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 5 'Locke') | |
| A reaction: This obviously has a point, but equally justifies confiscation of land from people who are not making best use of it. In Sicily many landowners refused to allow the peasants to make any use at all of the land. |
| 20534 | Rights and justice are only the last resorts of a society, something to fall back on [Wolff,J] |
| Full Idea: Justice is the last virtue of society, or at least the last resort. Rights, or considerations of justice, are like an insurance policy: something offering security to fall back on. | |
| From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 6 'Transcending') | |
| A reaction: I like this. He points out that a good family doesn't talk of rights and justice. We want a friendly harmonious society, with safety nets. |
| 20492 | Following some laws is not a moral matter; trivial traffic rules, for example [Wolff,J] |
| Full Idea: Some laws have little grounding in morality. You may believe you have a moral obligation to stop at a red light at a deserted crossroads, but only because that is what the law tells you to do. | |
| From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 2 'Goal') | |
| A reaction: I would have thought such a law was wholly grounded in the morality of teamwork. It is the problem of rule utilitarianism, and also a problem about virtuous character. The puzzle is not the law, but the strict obedience to it. |
| 19860 | Everyone must contribute to the state's power and administration, in just proportion [Mirabeau/committee] |
| Full Idea: For the maintenance of public force and the expenses of administration, a common contribution is indispensable. It must be equally apportioned among all citizens according to their abilities. | |
| From: Mirabeau and committee (Declaration of the Rights of Man [1789], 13) | |
| A reaction: Presumably this enshrines graduated income tax, an eighteenth century invention. Could you contribute just by your labour, or by fighting for the army? Those may be greater contributions than mere money. |