display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
24 ideas
18649 | If everyone owned himself, that would prevent slavery [Kymlicka] |
Full Idea: The best way to prevent enslavement of one person to another is to give each person ownership over himself. | |
From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) [1990], 4.2.c) | |
A reaction: [The idea comes from Nozick, but Kymlicka is assessing how it should be understood] The best way to block any social evil like slavery is to make it unthinkable. Legislation is second best. Presumably I could sell myself into slavery (like Faust)? |
22268 | If persons define themselves by a group membership, insults to that group are a real harm [Sandel] |
Full Idea: For persons who understand themselves as defined by the ethnic or religious group to which they belong, an insult to the group can inflict a harm as real and as damaging as some physical harms. | |
From: Michael J. Sandel (The Limits of Communitarianism [1998], 'Free speech') | |
A reaction: In Britain many people fully define themselves by their allegiance to a football club. Really! They usually learn to laugh off an insult to their club, but it hurts. Laughing off an insult is an essential modern skill - up to a point. |
22267 | In the liberal view an insult to my group doesn't hurt me, since I'm defined by choices not groups [Sandel] |
Full Idea: By the liberal conception of a person, my dignity could never be damaged by an insult to a group with which I identify, because what matters is not my social role, but my capacity to choose that role. | |
From: Michael J. Sandel (The Limits of Communitarianism [1998], 'Free speech') | |
A reaction: If I'm defined by my capacity to choose, and I choose to join some group, why is an insult to that group not an insult to my capacity to choose? How do you insult a liberal? 'I despise your individual freedom!'. |
18640 | Libertarians like the free market, but they also think that the free market is just [Kymlicka] |
Full Idea: Not everyone who favours the free market is a libertarian, for they do not all share the libertarian view that the free market is inherently just. | |
From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) [1990], 4.1.a) | |
A reaction: Illuminating. It would appear that exploitation is possible within a strictly free market, so it seems unlikely that free markets are inherently just (unless you don't acknowledge that 'exploitation' is wrong). |
18651 | The most valuable liberties to us need not be the ones with the most freedom [Kymlicka] |
Full Idea: Different liberties promote different interests for many different reasons, and there is no reason to assume that the liberties which are most valuable to us are the ones with the most freedom. | |
From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) [1990], 2.4.a.iii) | |
A reaction: As I grow older I come more and more to think that freedom is overvalued. But have you tried the other thing? We complacently take huge freedoms for granted. Be passionate about fundamental freedoms, and relaxed about the rest. |
18661 | Ancient freedom was free participation in politics, not private independence of life [Kymlicka] |
Full Idea: The liberty of the ancients was their active participation in the exercise of political power, not the peaceful enjoyment of personal independence. | |
From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) [1990], 7.2.a) | |
A reaction: Interesting. It takes a feat of imagination to grasp a world where the desire for freedom to sit at home and compile a database of philosophical ideas never even crossed anyone's mind. |
18633 | Equal opportunities seems fair, because your fate is from your choices, not your circumstances [Kymlicka] |
Full Idea: The ideology of equal opportunity seems fair to many people in our society because it ensures that people's fate is determined by their choices, rather than their circumstances. | |
From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) [1990], 3.2) | |
A reaction: Is it that we surmise that people have 'free will', and then engineer a situation where it can be exercised? Is it that the rest of us don't want to feel guilty when someone else's life goes awry (because it was 'their fault')? |
18634 | Equal opportunity arbitrarily worries about social circumstances, but ignores talents [Kymlicka] |
Full Idea: The prevailing view [of equal opportunity] only recognises differences in social circumstances, while ignoring differences in natural talents (or treating them as if they were a choice). This is an arbitrary limit on the theory's central intuition. | |
From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) [1990], 3.2) | |
A reaction: Of course we (society) can do a lot about your social circumstances, but very little about your talents, other than to develop them or thwart them. Talented children need more than mere 'opportunity'. |
18654 | Marxists say justice is unneeded in the truly good community [Kymlicka] |
Full Idea: Marxists believe that justice, far from being the first virtue of social institutions, is something that the truly good community has no need for. | |
From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) [1990], 5.1) | |
A reaction: This seems to imply that in the truly good community there are nothing but truly good individuals, which is taking social determinism to its limits. Are all the citizens of a bad community inherently bad? |
21040 | Libertarians just want formal equality in a free market; the meritocratic view wants fair equality [Sandel] |
Full Idea: The libertarian view of distributive justice is a free market with formal equality of opportunity. The meritocratic view is a free market with fair equality of opportunity. | |
From: Michael J. Sandel (Justice: What's the right thing to do? [2009], 06) | |
A reaction: The obvious question is what has to be done, by intervention, to make the market fair. There are two major rival views of equality here. Is the starting point fair, and is the race itself fair? |
18652 | The Lockean view of freedom depends on whether you had a right to what is restricted [Kymlicka] |
Full Idea: The Lockean camp defines freedom in terms of the exercise of our rights. Whether or not a restriction decreases our freedom depends on whether or not we had a right to do the restricted thing. | |
From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) [1990], 2.4.a.iii) | |
A reaction: My first instinct is to be sympathetic to this, since a detached and general notion of 'freedom' strikes me as suspect. He offers the rival 'Spenserian' view of freedom as just having the choice. |
23379 | Rights are a part of nation-building, to build a common national identity and culture [Kymlicka] |
Full Idea: Extending citizenship to include common social rights was a tool of nation-building, intended in part to construct and consolidate a sense of common national identity and culture. | |
From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn) [2002], 8) | |
A reaction: Kymlicka explains a lot of politics and society in terms of the desire of governments to 'build' their nation. You have to make people who are essentially powerless feel that they are at least in some way involved, and benefiting. |
23382 | Rights derived from group membership are opposed to the idea of state citizenship [Kymlicka] |
Full Idea: The organisation of society on the basis of rights or claims that derive from group membership is sharply opposed to the concept of society based on citizenship. | |
From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn) [2002], 8) | |
A reaction: [from John Porter 1987] Does this imply that you might have rights as part of a group which you don't have as a state citizen? Positive discrimination, for example. Differential rights sounds like potential trouble. |
21028 | We can approach justice through welfare, or freedom, or virtue [Sandel] |
Full Idea: We have identified three ways of approaching the distribution of goods: welfare, freedom and virtue. ...and these are three ways of thinking about justice. | |
From: Michael J. Sandel (Justice: What's the right thing to do? [2009], 01) | |
A reaction: Virtue is Sandel's distinctively Aristotelian contribution to the problem. The best known instance of justice is punishment, which is a distribution of harms. |
18655 | Justice corrects social faults, but also expresses respect to individuals as ends [Kymlicka] |
Full Idea: Justice is more than a remedial virtue. It does remedy defects in social co-ordination, ...but it also expresses the respect individuals are owed as ends in themselves, not as mean's to someone's good, or even to the common good. | |
From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) [1990], 5.1) | |
A reaction: That is, I take it, that justice operates at two different levels in our theoretical social thinking. |
23411 | Communitarians see justice as primarily a community matter, rather than a principle [Kymlicka] |
Full Idea: Communitarians believe either that community replaces the need for principles of justice, or that the community is either the source of such principles or should play a greater role in deciding their content. | |
From: Will Kymlicka (Community [1993], 'Intro') | |
A reaction: [compressed] The idea that a racist or chauvinist or puritanical or insular community should decide justice for all its members sounds horrible. It drives you to liberal individualism, just thinking about it. |
23412 | Justice resolves conflicts, but may also provoke them [Kymlicka] |
Full Idea: Justice can help mediate conflicts, but it also tends to creat conflicts, and to decrease the natural expression of sociability. | |
From: Will Kymlicka (Community [1993], 'limits') | |
A reaction: [He is discussing Michael Sandel on liberalism] Family life might not go well if all of its members continually demanded justice for themselves as individuals. Maybe our concept of justice is too individualistic? Do we need a sense of 'group' justice? |
21027 | Justice concerns how a society distributes what it prizes - wealth, rights, power and honours [Sandel] |
Full Idea: To ask whether a society is just is to ask how we distribute the things we prize - income and wealth, duties and rights, powers and opportunities, offices and honours. | |
From: Michael J. Sandel (Justice: What's the right thing to do? [2009], 01) | |
A reaction: There is, of course, the prior question of what things should be controlled by a society for distribution. But there is also justice in the promotional and pay structure of institutions within a society, including private institutions. |
21042 | Should we redress wrongs done by a previous generation? [Sandel] |
Full Idea: Can we ever have a moral responsibility to redress wrongs committed by a previous generation? | |
From: Michael J. Sandel (Justice: What's the right thing to do? [2009], 07) | |
A reaction: Just asking for a friend. It seems to depend on how close we feel to the previous generation. Regretting the crime committed by a beloved parent is one thing. Despising the crime committed by some right bastard who shares my nationality is another. |
21043 | Distributive justice concern deserts, as well as who gets what [Sandel] |
Full Idea: Debates about distributive justice are about not only who gets what but also what qualities are worthy of honour and reward. | |
From: Michael J. Sandel (Justice: What's the right thing to do? [2009], 07) | |
A reaction: So the 'undeserving poor' get nuffink? Does just being a human being deserve anything? Obviously yes. That said, we can't deny the concept of 'appropriate reward'. |
21052 | Justice is about how we value things, and not just about distributions [Sandel] |
Full Idea: Justice is not only about the right way to distribute things. It is also about the right way to value things. | |
From: Michael J. Sandel (Justice: What's the right thing to do? [2009], 10) | |
A reaction: This is Sandel's distinctively Aristotelian contribution to the justice debate - with which I have great sympathy. And, as he argues, the values of things arise out of assessing their essential natures. |
21048 | Work is not fair if it is negotiated, even in a fair situation, but if it suits the nature of the worker [Sandel] |
Full Idea: For the libertarian free exchange for labour is fair; for Rawls it requires fair background conditions; for Aristotle, for the work to be just it must be suited to the nature of the workers who perform it. | |
From: Michael J. Sandel (Justice: What's the right thing to do? [2009], 08) | |
A reaction: [compressed] Aristotle's idea is powerful, and Sandel performs a great service in drawing attention to it. Imagine the key negotiation in an interview being whether this particular work suits your nature! |
22266 | The case for religious liberty depends on the religion contributing to a morally good life [Sandel] |
Full Idea: Unless there were reason to believe that religious beliefs and practices contribute to morally admirable ways of life, the case for a right to religious liberty would be weakened. | |
From: Michael J. Sandel (The Limits of Communitarianism [1998], 'Religious') | |
A reaction: I think many religious people would deny that their religion is primarily moral. (W.Blake: 'If morality is Christianity, then Socrates was the saviour'). Whose concept of a morally good life is Sandel referring to? |
23378 | The welfare state helps to integrate the working classes into a national culture [Kymlicka] |
Full Idea: The development of the welfare state has been quite successful in integrating the working classes into national cultures throughout the Western democracies. | |
From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn) [2002], 8) | |
A reaction: Hard-line capitalists tend to hate the welfare state, as unfair to high earners, but it not only makes workers feel involved, but also provides a healthier, happier, more knowledgeable work force for employers. |