display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
3 ideas
| 16707 | Cold and hot are the swiftness and slowness of corpuscular motion [Beeckman] |
| Full Idea: There is no doubt that the nature of cold and hot are taken from the swiftness and slowness of the motion of corpuscules. | |
| From: Isaac Beeckman (Journals [1617], I:132), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 19.6 | |
| A reaction: This is so right it takes your breath away. For 'corpuscles' we should normally read 'molecules'. Atomism is a further refinement. This is the rejection of the orthodox view of separate qualities. |
| 15146 | Some kinds, such as electrons, have essences, but 'cluster kinds' do not [Chakravartty] |
| Full Idea: Many of the kinds we theorize about and experiment on today simply do not have essences. We can distinguish 'essence kinds', such as electrons, and 'cluster kinds', such as biological species. | |
| From: Anjan Chakravarrty (Inessential Aristotle: Powers without Essences [2012], 2) | |
| A reaction: This is an important point for essentialists. He offers a strict criterion, in Idea 15145, for mind membership, but we might allow species to have essences by just relaxing the criteria a bit, and acknowledging some vagueness, especially over time. |
| 15151 | Many causal laws do not refer to kinds, but only to properties [Chakravartty] |
| Full Idea: Causal laws often do not make reference to kinds of objects at all, but rather summarize relations between quantitative, causally efficacious properties of objects. | |
| From: Anjan Chakravarrty (Inessential Aristotle: Powers without Essences [2012], 3) | |
| A reaction: This would only be a serious challenge if it was not possible to translate talk of properties into talk of kinds, and vice versa. |