display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
12 ideas
17662 | Science depends on laws of nature to study unobserved times and spaces [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: The scientist trying to establish the geography and history of the unobserved portion of the universe must depend upon what he takes to be the laws of the universe. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 01.1) | |
A reaction: This does seem to be the prime reason why we wish to invoke 'laws', but we could just as well say that we have to rely on induction. Spot patterns, then expect more of the same. Spot necessities? Mathematics is very valuable here, of course. |
17682 | A universe couldn't consist of mere laws [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: A universe could hardly consist of laws and nothing else. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 06.4) | |
A reaction: Hm. Discuss. How does a universe come into existence, if there are no laws to guide its creation? |
17690 | Oaken conditional laws, Iron universal laws, and Steel necessary laws [Armstrong, by PG] |
Full Idea: Three degress of law: 1) 'Oaken laws' where all Fs that aren't Hs are Gs; 2) 'Iron' laws where all Fs are Gs; and 3) 'Steel' laws where all Fs must be Gs. | |
From: report of David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 10.4) by PG - Db (ideas) | |
A reaction: [My summary of Armstrong's distinction] One response is to say that all laws are actually Oaken - see Mumfor and Mumford/Lill Anjum. It's all ceteris paribus. |
17670 | Newton's First Law refers to bodies not acted upon by a force, but there may be no such body [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: Newton's First Law of Motion tells us what happens to a body which is not acted upon by a force. Yet it may be that the antecedent of the law is never instantiated. It may be that every body that there is, is acted upon by some force. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 02.7) |
8582 | Regularities are lawful if a second-order universal unites two first-order universals [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
Full Idea: Armstrong's theory holds that what makes certain regularities lawful are second-order states of affairs N(F,G) in which the two ordinary first-order universals F and G are related by a certain dyadic second-order universal N. | |
From: report of David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983]) by David Lewis - New work for a theory of universals 'Laws and C' | |
A reaction: [see Lewis's footnote] I take the view (from Shoemaker and Ellis) that laws of nature are just plain regularities which arise from the hierarchy of natural kinds. We don't need a commitment to 'universals'. |
17671 | A naive regularity view says if it never occurs then it is impossible [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: It is a Humean uniformity that no race of ravens is white-feathered. Hence, if the Naive Regularity analysis of law is correct, it is a law that no race of ravens is white-feathered, that is, such a race is physically impossible. A most unwelcome result. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 02.6) | |
A reaction: Chapters 2-4 of Armstrong are a storming attack on the regularity view of laws of nature, and this idea is particularly nice. Laws must refer to what could happen, not what happens to happen. |
8540 | The introduction of sparse properties avoids the regularity theory's problem with 'grue' [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: Regularity theories of laws face the grue problem. That, I think, can only be got over by introducing properties, sparse properties, into one's ontology. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Properties [1992], §2) | |
A reaction: The problem is, roughly, that regularities have to be described in language, which is too arbitrary in character. Armstrong rightly tries to break the rigid link to language. See his Idea 8536, which puts reality before language. |
8541 | Regularities theories are poor on causal connections, counterfactuals and probability [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: Regularity theories make laws molecular, with no inner causal connections; also, only some cosmic regularities are manifestations of laws; molecular states can't sustain counterfactuals; and probabilistic laws are hard to accommodate. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Properties [1992], §2) | |
A reaction: [very compressed] A helpful catalogue of difficulties. The first difficulty is the biggest one - that regularity theories have nothing to say about why there is a regularity. They offer descriptions instead of explanations. |
16246 | Rather than take necessitation between universals as primitive, just make laws primitive [Maudlin on Armstrong] |
Full Idea: My own view is simple: the laws of nature ought to be accepted as ontologically primitive. …They are preferable in point of familiarity to such necessitation relations between universals. | |
From: comment on David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983]) by Tim Maudlin - The Metaphysics within Physics 1.4 | |
A reaction: I think you make natures of things primitive, and reduce laws to regularities and universals to resemblances. Job done. Natures are even more 'familiar' as primitives than laws are. |
9480 | Armstrong has an unclear notion of contingent necessitation, which can't necessitate anything [Bird on Armstrong] |
Full Idea: The two criticisms levelled against Armstrong are that it is unclear what his relation of contingent necessitation is, and that it is unclear how it is able to necessitate anything. | |
From: comment on David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983]) by Alexander Bird - Nature's Metaphysics 3.1.2 | |
A reaction: I suppose someone has to explore the middle ground between the mere contingencies of Humean regularities and the strong necessities of scientific essentialism. The area doesn't, however, look promising. |
17681 | The laws of nature link properties with properties [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: There is an utterly natural idea that the laws of nature link properties with properties. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 06.3) | |
A reaction: Put it this way: given that properties are expressions of invariant powers, the interaction of two properties will (ceteris paribus) be invariant, and laws are just invariances in natural behaviour. |
5492 | How can essences generate the right powers to vary with distance between objects? [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: In Newtonian physics the distance between two objects determines the attractive forces between them, but then the objects will have to be sensitive to the distance, in order to 'know' what forces to generate; but distance isn't a causal power. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Two Problems for Essentialism [2001], p.170) | |
A reaction: Ellis replies that he is not troubled, because he believes in essential properties which are separate from their causal roles. Indeed, how else could you explain their causal roles? Still, distance must be mentioned when explaining gravity. |