display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
3 ideas
17689 | Absences might be effects, but surely not causes? [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: Lacks and absences could perhaps by thought of as effects, but we ought to be deeply reluctant to think of them as causes. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 10.4) | |
A reaction: Odd. So we allow that they exist (as effects), but then deny that they have any causal powers? |
18380 | Negative causations supervene on positive causations plus their laws? [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: Is it not very plausible that negative causations supervene on the positive causations together with the laws that govern the positive causations? | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 05.2.3) | |
A reaction: This obviously has a naturalistic appeal, since all causation can then be based on the actual world. |
4798 | In recent writings, Armstrong makes a direct identification of necessitation with causation [Armstrong, by Psillos] |
Full Idea: In recent writings, Armstrong makes a direct identification of necessitation with causation. | |
From: report of David M. Armstrong (A World of States of Affairs [1997]) by Stathis Psillos - Causation and Explanation §6.3.3 | |
A reaction: Obviously logical necessity is not causal, but as a proposal for simplifying accounts of necessity in nature, this is wonderfully simple and appealing. Is his proposal an elevation of causation, or a degradation of necessity? |