display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
22 ideas
1525 | Atomists say there are only three differences - in shape, arrangement and position [Democritus, by Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Democritus and Leucippus say that there are only three differences - in shape, arrangement and position. | |
From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], A006) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 0985b15 |
493 | Experiences are merely convention; only atoms and the void are real [Democritus] |
Full Idea: Sweet exists by convention, bitter by convention, colour by convention; atoms and void alone exist in reality. | |
From: Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], B009), quoted by Sextus Empiricus - Against the Logicians (two books) 7.135 |
17542 | 'Full' and 'Void' secularised Parmenides's Being and Not-being [Democritus, by Heisenberg] |
Full Idea: In atomism, the antithesis of Being and Not-being of Parmenides is secularised into the antithesis of the 'Full' and the 'Void'. | |
From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE]) by Werner Heisenberg - Physics and Philosophy 04 |
5947 | If only atoms are real and the rest is convention, we wouldn't bother to avoid pain [Democritus, by Diogenes of Oen.] |
Full Idea: Democritus erred when he said that the atoms alone exist in truth among realities, but everything else is convention; for then, far from discovering the truth, we shall not even be able to live, since we shall avoid neither fire nor wounds. | |
From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE]) by Diogenes (Oen) - fragments/reports F2 7 | |
A reaction: The point is that we have to treat pain as a reality, not just as a convention. I suspect that Diogenes is making the same mistake made by modern attackers of 'eliminativism'. It is all about identity and reduction and levels of reality… |
13219 | When atoms touch, why don't they coalesce, like water drops? [Aristotle on Democritus] |
Full Idea: Why, when they come into contact, do they [atoms] not coalesce into one, as drops of water run together when drop touches drop? | |
From: comment on Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE]) by Aristotle - Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) 326a33 | |
A reaction: Presumably we must think of atoms as having basic ontological unity, rather than as being little globules of 'stuff'. They are more like monads than they are like mud. |
1533 | Because appearance is infinitely varied, atomists assume infinitely many shapes of atom [Democritus, by Aristotle] |
Full Idea: They thought that truth lay in appearances, which they appreciated are contradictory and infinite, so they made the shapes of atoms infinite. Thus the infinite changes in compounds create the infinitely varies appearances. | |
From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], A009) by Aristotle - Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) 315b9 |
20899 | Atoms cling together, until a stronger necessity disperses them [Democritus, by Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Democritus thinks that the substances hold on to one another and remain together for a length of time until some stronger necessity arising from their surroundings shakes and disperses them. | |
From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], A037) by Aristotle - On Democritus (frag) | |
A reaction: [quoted in Simplicius, Commentary on Aristotle's On the Heavens] He's not wrong. This seems to provide a mechanism for the Heracltean flux. Ancient critics wanted to know where the 'stronger necessity' came from. |
20898 | Atoms are irregular, hooked, concave, convex, and many other shapes [Democritus, by Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Some substances are irregular, others hook-shaped, other concave, other convex, others provided with innumerable other differences. | |
From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], A037) by Aristotle - On Democritus (frag) | |
A reaction: [quoted in Simplicius, Commentary on Aristotle's On the Heavens] 'Substance' here means a fundamental object, which for Democritus is an undividable atom. |
20908 | There could be an atom the size of the world [Democritus, by Ps-Plutarch] |
Full Idea: Democritus say that it is possible that there exists an atom of the size of the world. | |
From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], A047) by Pseudo-Plutarch - On the Doctrine of the Philosophers 1.12.6 | |
A reaction: The editor says this may have been a criticism of Democritus - presumably a reductio ad absurdum. But Democritus has no upper limit on the size of an atom. It challenges the imagination to treat such a huge thing as indivisible. |
1527 | There must be atoms, to avoid the absurdity of infinite division down to nothing [Democritus, by Aristotle] |
Full Idea: If everything is infinitely divided, what survives the divisions? Alternatively, division would end at points with no magnitude, in which case bodies are composed of nothing. This is the argument claiming there are atoms of some magnitude. | |
From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], A048b) by Aristotle - Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) 316a14- |
20909 | The basic atoms are without qualities - which only arise from encounters between atoms [Democritus, by Galen] |
Full Idea: Democritus and the Epicureans posit that the first element is without quality, possessing by nature neither whiteness, blackness, sweetness or bitterness, warmth or cold. ...It is from the encounter of the atoms that all the sensible qualities come about. | |
From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], A049) by Galen - On Hippocrates and Plato 1.2 | |
A reaction: Idea 493 comes in the middle of this summary by Galen. Hence atoms play the role that substrates play in object-based metaphysics. So atoms have the same problem. Is the shape of an atom a quality of an atom. Or are qualities what atoms DO? |
1536 | If a cone is horizontally sliced the surfaces can't be equal, so it goes up in steps [Democritus] |
Full Idea: If a cone is cut parallel to the base are the two new surfaces equal or unequal? If they are unequal, the cone must have gone up in steps. If they are equal then the cone must have been a cylinder, which is absurd. | |
From: Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], B155), quoted by Plutarch - 72: Against Stoics on common Conceptions 1079e1 |
8337 | Some says mental causation is distinct because we can recognise single occurrences [Mackie] |
Full Idea: It is sometimes suggested that our ability to recognise a single occurrence as an instance of mental causation is a feature which distinguishes mental causation from physical or 'Humean' causation. | |
From: J.L. Mackie (Causes and Conditions [1965], §9) | |
A reaction: Hume says regularities are needed for mental causation too. Concentrate hard on causing a lightning flash - 'did I do that?' Gradually recovering from paralysis; you wouldn't just move your leg once, and know it was all right! |
8342 | Mackie tries to analyse singular causal statements, but his entities are too vague for events [Kim on Mackie] |
Full Idea: In spite of Mackie's announced aim of analysing singular causal statements, it is doubtful that the entities that he is concerned with can be consistently interpreted as spatio-temporally bounded individual events. | |
From: comment on J.L. Mackie (Causes and Conditions [1965]) by Jaegwon Kim - Causes and Events: Mackie on causation §3 | |
A reaction: This is because Mackie mainly talks about 'conditions'. Nearly every theory I encounter in modern philosophy gets accused of either circular definitions, or inadequate individuation conditions for key components. A tough world for theory-makers. |
8343 | Necessity and sufficiency are best suited to properties and generic events, not individual events [Kim on Mackie] |
Full Idea: Relations of necessity and sufficiency seem best suited for properties and for property-like entities such as generic states and events; their application to individual events and states is best explained as derivative from properties and generic events. | |
From: comment on J.L. Mackie (Causes and Conditions [1965]) by Jaegwon Kim - Causes and Events: Mackie on causation §4 | |
A reaction: This seems to suggest that necessity must either derive from laws, or from powers. It is certainly hard to see how you could do Mackie's assessment of necessary and sufficient components, without comparing similar events. |
8385 | A cause is part of a wider set of conditions which suffices for its effect [Mackie, by Crane] |
Full Idea: The details of Mackie's analysis are complex, but the general idea is that the cause is part of a wider set of conditions which suffices for its effect. | |
From: report of J.L. Mackie (Causes and Conditions [1965]) by Tim Crane - Causation 1.3.3 | |
A reaction: Helpful. Why does something have to be 'the' cause? Immediacy is a vital part of it. A house could be a 'fire waiting to happen'. Oxygen is an INUS condition for a fire. |
8335 | Necessary conditions are like counterfactuals, and sufficient conditions are like factual conditionals [Mackie] |
Full Idea: A necessary causal condition is closely related to a counterfactual conditional: if no-cause then no-effect, and a sufficient causal condition is closely related to a factual conditional (Goodman's phrase): since cause-here then effect. | |
From: J.L. Mackie (Causes and Conditions [1965], §4) | |
A reaction: The 'factual conditional' just seems to be an assertion that causation occurred (dressed up with the logical-sounding 'since'). An important distinction for Lewis. Sufficiency doesn't seem to need possible-worlds talk. |
8336 | The INUS account interprets single events, and sequences, causally, without laws being known [Mackie] |
Full Idea: My account shows how a singular causal statement can be interpreted, and how the corresponding sequence can be shown to be causal, even if the corresponding complete laws are not known. | |
From: J.L. Mackie (Causes and Conditions [1965], §9) | |
A reaction: Since the 'complete' laws are virtually never known, it would be a bit much to require that to assert causation. His theory is the 'INUS' account of causal conditions - see Idea 8333. |
8333 | A cause is an Insufficient but Necessary part of an Unnecessary but Sufficient condition [Mackie] |
Full Idea: If a short-circuit causes a fire, the so-called cause is, and is known to be, an Insufficient but Necessary part of a condition which is itself Unnecessary but Sufficient for the result. Let us call this an INUS condition. | |
From: J.L. Mackie (Causes and Conditions [1965], §1) | |
A reaction: I'm not clear why it is necessary, given that the fire could have started without the short-circuit. The final situation must certainly be sufficient. If only one situation can cause an effect, then the whole situation is necessary. |
8395 | Mackie has a nomological account of general causes, and a subjunctive conditional account of single ones [Mackie, by Tooley] |
Full Idea: For general causal statements Mackie favours a nomological account, but for singular causal statements he argued for an analysis in terms of subjunctive conditionals. | |
From: report of J.L. Mackie (Causes and Conditions [1965]) by Michael Tooley - Causation and Supervenience 5.2 | |
A reaction: These seem to be consistent, by explaining each by placing it within a broader account of reality. Personally I think Ducasse gives the best account of how you get from the particular to the general (via similarity and utility). |
8334 | The virus causes yellow fever, and is 'the' cause; sweets cause tooth decay, but they are not 'the' cause [Mackie] |
Full Idea: We may say not merely that this virus causes yellow fever, but also that it is 'the' cause of yellow fever; but we could only say that sweet-eating causes dental decay, not that it is the cause of dental decay (except in an individual case). | |
From: J.L. Mackie (Causes and Conditions [1965], §3) | |
A reaction: A bit confusing, but there seems to be something important here, concerning the relation between singular causation and law-governed causation. 'The' cause may not be sufficient (I'm immune to yellow fever). So 'the' cause is the only necessary one? |
23314 | Greeks explained regularity by intellectual design, not by laws [Democritus, by Frede,M] |
Full Idea: It is clear that Democritus had no idea of laws of nature …for in Greek thought regularity of behaviour is associated with design by an intellect. | |
From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE]) by Michael Frede - A Free Will Intro | |
A reaction: Ah. A simple realisation…! Seventeenth century laws of nature offered an explanation of natural order which didn't rely on God. Even though those scientists were all theists. |