Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Anaxarchus, Wilfrid Hodges and Aristotle

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3 ideas

26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 1. Natural Kinds
Unusual kinds like mule are just a combination of two kinds [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: The kind that is common to both horse and ass and which most nearly comprises them happens not to have a name, but can safely be presumed to be both, i.e. the horse-ass or 'mule'. ...A mule does not come from a mule.
     From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1033b32)
     A reaction: [second part at 1034b04] Does ancient Greek have a word for 'mule' - it sounds as if it doesn't. Nice chicken-and-egg problem. Must a natural kind be derived from a natural kind? No. Gold does not derive from gold.
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 2. Defining Kinds
All water is the same, because of a certain similarity [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Any water is said to be specifically the same as any other water because it has a certain similarity to it.
     From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 103a20)
     A reaction: (Cf. Idea 8153) It take this to be the hallmark of a natural kind, and we should not lose sight of it in the midst of discussions about rigid designation and essential identity. Tigers are only a natural kind insofar as they are indistinguishable.
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 6. Necessity of Kinds
Whatever holds of a kind intrinsically holds of it necessarily [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: In each kind, whatever holds of something in itself and as such holds of it from necessity.
     From: Aristotle (Posterior Analytics [c.327 BCE], 75a30)
     A reaction: This seems to confirm the view that essential properties are necessary, but it does not, of course, follow that all necessary properties are essential properties (e.g. trivial necessities are not essential).