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15253
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If the concept of a cause includes its usual effects, we call it a 'power' [Harré/Madden]
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Full Idea:
The concept of cause may come to include the concepts of its usual effects. Concepts of this character are used in science, and in common language, to ascribe powers.
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From:
Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 3.II)
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A reaction:
See Theme 8|c|3 in Theme/Structure for more ideas about powers. It's hard to see how you could specify a cause at all if you weren't allowed to say what it does. I love powers, and want to make them the key idea in all of metaphysics.
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15278
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Humean accounts of causal direction by time fail, because cause and effect can occur together [Harré/Madden]
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Full Idea:
The Humean effort to ground the intuition of causal directionality on temporal priority of cause alone fails, because in fact some causes and effects are simultaneous. The moving of the knife and separation of the orange occur together.
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From:
Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 6.IV)
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A reaction:
Since I take causation to be largely concerned with movements of 'energy', this idea that cause and effect might be simultaneous sounds more like a matter of pragmatics and convention. Moving the knife and moving the orange are different.
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15217
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Efficient causes combine stimulus to individuals, absence of contraints on activity [Harré/Madden]
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Full Idea:
Efficient causes comprise both the presence of stimuli which activate a quiescent individual, and the absence or removal of constraints upon an individual already in a state of activity.
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From:
Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 1.II.B)
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A reaction:
This is part of an account of causation in term of 'powers', with which I agree. Before you object, there is always going to be something about causation which is mind boggling weird, and probably leaves even God bewildered.
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