Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Cardinal/Hayward/Jones, J.L. Austin and Willard Quine

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3 ideas

26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
It is hard to see how regularities could be explained [Quine]
     Full Idea: Why there have been regularities is an obscure question, for it is hard to see what would count as an answer.
     From: Willard Quine (Natural Kinds [1969], p.126)
     A reaction: This is the standard pessimism of the 20th century Humeans, but it strikes me as comparable to the pessimism about science found in Locke and Hume. Regularities are explained all the time by scientists, though the lowest level may be hopeless.
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / e. Anti scientific essentialism
Essence gives an illusion of understanding [Quine, by Almog]
     Full Idea: Essence engenders a mere illusion of understanding
     From: report of Willard Quine (works [1961]) by Joseph Almog - Nature Without Essence Intro
     A reaction: [Almog quotes Quine, but doesn't give a reference] This is roughly the same as Popper's criticism of essentialism.
We can't say 'necessarily if x is in water then x dissolves' if we can't quantify modally [Quine]
     Full Idea: To say an object is soluble in water is to say that it would dissolve if it were in water,..which implies that 'necessarily if x is in water then x dissolves'. Yet we do not know if there is a suitable sense of 'necessarily' into which we can so quantify.
     From: Willard Quine (Reference and Modality [1953], §4)
     A reaction: This is why there has been a huge revival of scientific essentialism - because Krike seems to offer exacty the account which Quine said was missing. So can you have modal logic without rigid designation?