display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
6 ideas
4422 | The end need not be the goal, as in the playing of a melody (and yet it must be completed) [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Not every end is the goal; the end of a melody is not its goal; and yet: as long as the melody has not reached its end, it also hasn't reached its goal. A parable. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Wanderer and his Shadow [1880], §204) | |
A reaction: A nice message for Aristotle, that there is no simple separation of ends and means. |
7176 | 'Purpose' is like the sun, where most heat is wasted, and a tiny part has 'purpose' [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The case of every purposive action is like the supposed purposiveness of the sun's heat - the huge mass of it is wasted, and a part barely worth considering has 'purpose', has 'meaning'. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Writings from Late Notebooks [1887], 07[1]) | |
A reaction: A very nice metaphor for human life, where you might discern a purpose in certain large events, but you certainly won't find it in the myriad of small actions that make up nearly all of our existence. |
7195 | If the world aimed at an end, it would have reached it by now [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: If the world process were directed towards a final state, that state would have been reached by now. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Writings from Late Notebooks [1887], 11[72]) | |
A reaction: If advanced aliens existed, they would be here by now... I doubt if anyone now believes that the world has an end. However, strictly speaking, how could we possibly assess the time scale for such things? |
2905 | 'Purpose' is just a human fiction [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: We invented the concept 'purpose': in reality purpose is lacking. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 5.8) |
12245 | Essence is the source of a thing's characteristic behaviour [Oderberg] |
Full Idea: In the traditional terminology, function follows essence. Essence just is the principle from which flows the characteristic behaviour of a thing. | |
From: David S. Oderberg (Real Essentialism [2007], 2.1) | |
A reaction: Hence essence must be identified if the behaviour is to be explained, and a successful identification of essence is the terminus of our explanations. But the essences must go down to the micro-level. Explain non-characteristic behaviour? |
12246 | What makes Parmenidean reality a One rather than a Many? [Oderberg] |
Full Idea: Even if there were no multiplicity in unity - only a Parmenidean 'block' - still the question would arise as to what gave the amorphous lump its unity; by virtue of what would it be one rather than many? | |
From: David S. Oderberg (Real Essentialism [2007], 3.1) | |
A reaction: Which is prior, division or unification? If it was divided, he would ask what divided it. One of them must be primitive, so why not unity? If one big Unity is primitive, why could not lots of unities be primitive? Etc. |