12907
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Each possible world contains its own laws, reflected in the possible individuals of that world [Leibniz]
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Full Idea:
As there exist an infinite number of possible worlds, there exists also an infinite number of laws, some peculiar to one world, some to another, and each individual of any one world contains in the concept of him the laws of his world.
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From:
Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Antoine Arnauld [1686], 1686.06)
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A reaction:
Since Leibniz's metaphysics is thoroughly God-driven, he will obviously allow God to create any laws He wishes, and hence scientific essentialism seems to be rejected, even though Leibniz is keen on essences. Unless the stuff is different...
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13194
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God's laws would be meaningless without internal powers for following them [Leibniz]
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Full Idea:
To say that, in creation, God gave bodies a law for acting means nothing, unless, at the same time, he gave them something by means of which it could happen that the law is followed.
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From:
Gottfried Leibniz (On Body and Force, Against the Cartesians [1702], p.253)
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A reaction:
This is the beginning of the modern rebellion against the medieval view of laws as imposed from outside on passive matter. Unfortunately for Leibniz, once you have postulated active internal powers, the external laws become redundant.
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11854
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If there is some trace of God in things, that would explain their natural force [Leibniz]
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Full Idea:
If the law of God does indeed leave some vestige of him expressed in things...then it must be granted that there is a certain efficacy residing in things, a form or force such as we usually designate by the name of nature, from which the phenomena follow.
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From:
Gottfried Leibniz (On Nature Itself (De Ipsa Natura) [1698], §06)
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A reaction:
I wouldn't rate this as a very promising theory of powers, but it seems to me important that Leibniz recognises the innate power in things as needing explanation. If you remove divine power, you are left with unexplained intrinsic powers.
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19403
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Each of the infinite possible worlds has its own laws, and the individuals contain those laws [Leibniz]
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Full Idea:
As there are an infinity of possible worlds, there are also an infinity of laws, some proper to one, another to another, and each possible individual of any world contains in its own notion the laws of its world.
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From:
Gottfried Leibniz (On Sufficient Reason [1686], p.95)
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A reaction:
Hence Leibniz is not really a scientific essentialist, in that he doesn't think the laws arise out of the nature of the matter consituting the world. I wonder if the primitive matter of bodies which attaches to the monads is the same in each world?
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11945
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In addition to laws, God must also create appropriate natures for things [Leibniz]
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Full Idea:
It isn't sufficient to say that God has made a general law, for in addition to the decree there has also to be a natural way of carrying it out. It is necessary, that is, that what happens should be explicable in terms of the God-given nature of things.
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From:
Gottfried Leibniz (Letter to the Editor about Bayle [1698], p.205)
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A reaction:
Thus Leibniz is an ancestor of scientific essentialism, but he was too frightened to take the next step, which is to see that once God has endowed the natures, he doesn't need to wield his laws as well. The natures will do the whole job.
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13093
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The only permanence in things, constituting their substance, is a law of continuity [Leibniz]
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Full Idea:
Nothing is permanent in things except the law itself, which involves a continuous succession ...The fact that a certain law persists ...is the very fact that constitutes the same substance.
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From:
Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Burcher De Volder [1706], 1704)
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A reaction:
Aristotle and Leibniz are the very clear ancestors of modern scientific essentialism. I've left out a few inconvenient bits, about containing 'the whole universe', and containing all 'future states'. For Leibniz, laws are entirely rooted in things.
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7859
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Leibniz had an unusual commitment to the causal completeness of physics [Leibniz, by Papineau]
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Full Idea:
Unlike most philosophers prior to the twentieth century, Leibniz was committed to the causal completeness of physics.
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From:
report of Gottfried Leibniz (works [1690]) by David Papineau - Thinking about Consciousness 1.4
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A reaction:
It has been suggested that Leibniz was actually, in private, a determinist (see Idea 7841), which would fit. Leibniz is enigmatic, but he may have proposed the closure of physics to glorify God, only to find that God was beginning to look irrelevant.
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