display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
37 ideas
| 19429 | The principle of determination in things obtains the greatest effect with the least effort [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: There is always in things a principle of determination which is based on consideration of maximum and minimum, such that the greatest effect is obtained with the least, so to speak, expenditure. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (On the Ultimate Origination of Things [1697], p.347) | |
| A reaction: This is obvious in human endeavours. Leibniz applied it to physics, producing a principle that shortest paths are always employed. It has a different formal name in modern physics, I think. He says if you make an unrestricted triangle, it is equilateral. |
| 19376 | A machine is best defined by its final cause, which explains the roles of the parts [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: Any machine ...is best defined in terms of its final cause, so that in the description of the parts it is therefore apparent in what way each of them is coordinated with the others for the intended us. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (The Human Body is a sort of Machine [1683], p.290), quoted by Richard T.W. Arthur - Leibniz 3 'Machines' | |
| A reaction: We would use the 'function', an inherently teleological concept, and a concept which is almost indispensable for giving an illuminating description of the world. If nature is dispositional, it points towards things. Leibniz views persons as machines. |
| 19356 | Minds unconsciously count vibration beats in music, and enjoy it when they coincide [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: In music, the soul counts the beats of the vibrating object which makes the sound, and when these beats regularly coincide at short intervals, it finds them pleasing. Thus it counts without knowing it. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Note L to Bayle's 'Rorarius' [1705], [L]) | |
| A reaction: Only a mathematician would see music this way! He is defending his account of the unconscious mind. The proposal that we unconsciously count sounds highly implausible. He needs to recognise the patterns that ground mathematics. |
| 19399 | Prime matter is nothing when it is at rest [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: Primary matter is nothing if considered at rest. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (Aristotle and Descartes on Matter [1671], p.90) | |
| A reaction: This goes with Leibniz's Idea 13393, that activity is the hallmark of existence. No one seems to have been able to make good sense of prime matter, and it plays little role in Aristotle's writings. |
| 12707 | The true elements are atomic monads [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: Monads are the true atoms of nature and, in brief, the elements of things. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (Monadology [1716], (opening)), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 2 | |
| A reaction: Thus in one sentence Leibniz gives us a theory of natural elements, and an account of atoms. This kind of speculation got metaphysics a bad name when science unravelled a more accurate picture. The bones must be picked out of Leibniz. |
| 15955 | I think the corpuscular theory, rather than forms or qualities, best explains particular phenomena [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: I still subscribe fully to the corpuscular theory in the explanation of particular phenomena; in this sphere it is of no value to speak of forms or qualities. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Antoine Arnauld [1686], 14.07.1686) | |
| A reaction: I am puzzled by Garber's summary in Idea 12728, and a bit unclear on Leibniz's views on atoms. More needed. |
| 12728 | Leibniz rejected atoms, because they must be elastic, and hence have parts [Leibniz, by Garber] |
| Full Idea: Leibniz held that there can be no atoms in nature, nothing perfectly solid and hard, since elasticity entails the existence of smaller parts that can move with respect to one another. | |
| From: report of Gottfried Leibniz (works [1690]) by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 5 | |
| A reaction: Thus, I suppose, we discover that atoms have mercurial electron shells. Are quarks or electrons elastic? The debate about true atoms is not over, and probably never will be. Leibniz's point is a good one. |
| 2102 | Atomism is irrational because it suggests that two atoms can be indistinguishable [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: There are no two individuals indiscernible from one another - leaves, or drops of water, for example. This is an argument against atoms, which, like the void, are opposed to the principles of a true metaphysic. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Samuel Clarke [1716], 4.04) |
| 19374 | Microscopes and the continuum suggest that matter is endlessly divisible [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: Micrographers observe qualities of larger things found in smaller things. And if this proceeds to infinity - which is possible since the continuum is divisible to infinity - any atom will be an infinite species, and there will be worlds within worlds. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (works [1690], A VI ii 241) | |
| A reaction: [a work of the 1670s] The microscope had a huge impact on Leibniz, much more than the telescope. |
| 12759 | There are atoms of substance, but no atoms of bulk or extension [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: Although there are atoms of substance, namely monads, which lack parts, there are no atoms of bulk [moles], that is, atoms of the least possible extension, nor are there any ultimate elements, since a continuum cannot be composed out of points. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Nature Itself (De Ipsa Natura) [1698], §11) | |
| A reaction: Leibniz has a constant battle for the rest of his career to explain what these 'atoms of substance' are, since they have location but no extension, they are self-sufficient yet generate force, and are non-physical but interact with matter. |
| 2105 | Things are infinitely subdivisible and contain new worlds, which atoms would make impossible [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: The least corpuscle is actually subdivided ad infinitum and contains a world of new created things, which this universe would lack if this corpuscle were an atom. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Samuel Clarke [1716], 4.PS) |
| 2106 | The only simple things are monads, with no parts or extension [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: According to me there is nothing simple except true monads, which have no parts and no extensions. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Samuel Clarke [1716], 5.24) |
| 7560 | Leibniz struggled to reconcile bodies with a reality of purely soul-like entities [Jolley on Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: Leibniz seems never to have made up his mind completely on how to accommodate bodies within a metaphysic which recognises only soul-like entities as fully real. | |
| From: comment on Gottfried Leibniz (works [1690]) by Nicholas Jolley - Leibniz Intro | |
| A reaction: [The soul-like entities are his 'monads']. His choice must be to either say they are unreal, or that they are real and separate from the monads, or that they are a manifestation of the monads. His problem, not mine. |
| 12718 | Secondary matter is active and complete; primary matter is passive and incomplete [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: I understand matter as either secondary or primary. Secondary matter is, indeed, a complete substance, but it is not merely passive; primary matter is merely passive, but it is not a complete substance. So we must add a soul or form... | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Nature Itself (De Ipsa Natura) [1698], §12), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 4 | |
| A reaction: It sounds as if primary matter is redundant, but Garber suggests that secondary matter is just the combination of primary matter with form. |
| 19416 | Not all of matter is animated, any more than a pond full of living fish is animated [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: It must not be said that each portion of matter is animated, just as we do not say that a pond full of fishes is an animated body, although a fish is. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (Principle of Life and Plastic Natures [1705], p.190) | |
| A reaction: This is a particularly clear picture of the role of monads in matter. Monads are attached to bodies, which are entirely inanimate, but monads suffuse matter and give it its properties, like particularly bubbly champagne. Cf Idea 19422. |
| 19422 | Every particle of matter contains organic bodies [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: There is no particle of matter which does not contain organic bodies. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (Principle of Life and Plastic Natures [1705], p.198) | |
| A reaction: Cf Idea 19416. There seems to be an interaction problem here (solved, presumably, by pre-established harmony). The organic bodies are there to explain the active behaviour of matter, but the related matter seems intrinsically inert. |
| 19436 | Bare or primary matter is passive; it is clothed or secondary matter which contains action [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: The active principle is not attributed by me to bare or primary matter, which is merely passive ...but to clothed or secondary matter which in addition contains a primitive entelechy, or active principle. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Wagner [1710], 1710 §2) | |
| A reaction: Secondary matter contains monads. The puzzling question is what primary matter consists of. It is not atoms, because it is infinitely divisible, and it seems to be composed of corpuscles. But what is it made of? Just gunge? He says it is 'flux'. |
| 13185 | Even if extension is impenetrable, this still offers no explanation for motion and its laws [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: Even if we grant impenetrability is added to extension, nothing complete is brought about, nothing from which a reason for motion, and especially the laws of motion, can be given. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Burcher De Volder [1706], 1704 or 1705) | |
| A reaction: When it comes to the reasons for the so-called 'laws of nature', scientists give up, because they've only got mathematical descriptions, whereas the philosopher won't give up (even though, embarassingly, the evidence is running a bit thin). |
| 16683 | Leibniz eventually said resistance, rather than extension, was the essence of body [Leibniz, by Pasnau] |
| Full Idea: Leibniz eventually rejected extension altogether as part of the essence of body, and replaced it with resistance. | |
| From: report of Gottfried Leibniz (works [1690]) by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 15.5 | |
| A reaction: This makes body consist of active force, rather than mere geometry. Much better. |
| 19425 | In the schools the Four Causes are just lumped together in a very obscure way [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: In the schools the four causes are lumped together as material, formal, efficient, and final causes, but they have no clear definitions, and I would call such a judgment 'obscure'. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (Reflections on Knowledge, Truth and Ideas [1684], p.283) | |
| A reaction: He picks this to illustrate what he means by 'obscure', so he must feel strongly about it. Elsewhere Leibniz embraces efficient and final causes, but says little of the other two. This immediately become clearer as the Four Modes of Explanation. |
| 5059 | Power rules in efficient causes, but wisdom rules in connecting them to final causes [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: In all of nature efficient causes correspond to final causes, because everything proceeds from a cause which is not only powerful, but wise; and with the rule of power through efficient causes, there is involved the rule of wisdom through final causes. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (Metaphysical conseqs of principle of reason [1712], §5) | |
| A reaction: Nowadays this carrot-and-stick view of causation is unfashionable, but I won't rule it out. The deepest 'why?' we can ask won't just go away. This unity by a divine mind strikes me as too simple, but Leibniz is right to try to unify Aristotelian causes. |
| 2117 | The connection in events enables us to successfully predict the future, so there must be a constant cause [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: There is a connection among our appearances that provides us the means to predict future appearances with success, and this connection must have a constant cause. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Foucher [1675]) |
| 12702 | Causes can be inferred from perfect knowledge of their effects [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: Whoever understands some effect perfectly will also arrive at the knowledge of its cause. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (Meditatio de principio individui [1676], A6.3.490), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 2 | |
| A reaction: This sounds highly improbable, given that you would have thought that there could be lots of ways to bring about the same effect. Predicting effects is rather more plausible. I suppose if you can record all the ripples in the pond before they fade... |
| 12907 | Each possible world contains its own laws, reflected in the possible individuals of that world [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: As there exist an infinite number of possible worlds, there exists also an infinite number of laws, some peculiar to one world, some to another, and each individual of any one world contains in the concept of him the laws of his world. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Antoine Arnauld [1686], 1686.06) | |
| A reaction: Since Leibniz's metaphysics is thoroughly God-driven, he will obviously allow God to create any laws He wishes, and hence scientific essentialism seems to be rejected, even though Leibniz is keen on essences. Unless the stuff is different... |
| 13194 | God's laws would be meaningless without internal powers for following them [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: To say that, in creation, God gave bodies a law for acting means nothing, unless, at the same time, he gave them something by means of which it could happen that the law is followed. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Body and Force, Against the Cartesians [1702], p.253) | |
| A reaction: This is the beginning of the modern rebellion against the medieval view of laws as imposed from outside on passive matter. Unfortunately for Leibniz, once you have postulated active internal powers, the external laws become redundant. |
| 13177 | An entelechy is a law of the series of its event within some entity [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: I recognize a primitive entelechy in the active force found in motion, something analogous to the soul, whose nature consists in a certain law of the same series of changes. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Burcher De Volder [1706], 1699.03.24) | |
| A reaction: This is his 'law-of-the-series', which is a speculative attempt to pin down the character of the active essence of things which gives rise to activity. The law of such activity is within the things themselves, as scientific essentialists claim. |
| 11854 | If there is some trace of God in things, that would explain their natural force [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: If the law of God does indeed leave some vestige of him expressed in things...then it must be granted that there is a certain efficacy residing in things, a form or force such as we usually designate by the name of nature, from which the phenomena follow. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Nature Itself (De Ipsa Natura) [1698], §06) | |
| A reaction: I wouldn't rate this as a very promising theory of powers, but it seems to me important that Leibniz recognises the innate power in things as needing explanation. If you remove divine power, you are left with unexplained intrinsic powers. |
| 11856 | Qualities should be predictable from the nature of the subject [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: Whenever we find some quality in a subject, we ought to believe that if we understood the nature of both the subject and the quality we would conceive how the quality could arise from it. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], Pref 66) | |
| A reaction: This is the idea that powers are prior to properties, which seems right to me. I take essence to be something like the best explanation of qualities. |
| 12994 | Gold has a real essence, unknown to us, which produces its properties [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: The complex idea of gold includes its being something which has a real essence whose detailed constitution is unknown to us, except for the fact that such qualities as malleability depend upon it. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 3.10) | |
| A reaction: This is precisely the view of modern scientific essentialism. The underlying idea I take to be the conception of essence as the thing which explains the properties. |
| 12808 | Part of our idea of gold is its real essence, which is not known to us in detail [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: It is very true that it is part of the complex idea of gold that it is a thing which has a real essence, the constitution of which is not otherwise known to us in detail. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 6.6.345), quoted by Nicholas Jolley - Leibniz and Locke on Essences p.201 | |
| A reaction: See also Idea 12807. This is the clearest possible statement of Leibniz's clear-cut scientific essentialism, here presented in opposition to Locke (thought I take the latter to be only bothered by our inability to know the hidden constitution). |
| 19403 | Each of the infinite possible worlds has its own laws, and the individuals contain those laws [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: As there are an infinity of possible worlds, there are also an infinity of laws, some proper to one, another to another, and each possible individual of any world contains in its own notion the laws of its world. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Sufficient Reason [1686], p.95) | |
| A reaction: Hence Leibniz is not really a scientific essentialist, in that he doesn't think the laws arise out of the nature of the matter consituting the world. I wonder if the primitive matter of bodies which attaches to the monads is the same in each world? |
| 12725 | Leibniz wanted to explain motion and its laws by the nature of body [Leibniz, by Garber] |
| Full Idea: Leibniz seeks the big picture: the nature of body as a grounding for an account of motion and its laws. | |
| From: report of Gottfried Leibniz (works [1690]) by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 4 | |
| A reaction: Garber is contrasting this with Newton's approaches, who just pleads ignorance of the bigger picture. Essentialists must beware of inventing a bigger picture simply because they desperately want a bigger picture. |
| 16507 | The law within something fixes its persistence, and accords with general laws of nature [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: Nothing is permanent in a substance except the law itself which determines the continuous succession of its states and accords within the individual substance with the laws of nature that govern the whole world. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (works [1690], G II:263), quoted by David Wiggins - Sameness and Substance 3 epig | |
| A reaction: An interesting link between the law-of-series within a substance, and the broader concept of laws outside it. |
| 11945 | In addition to laws, God must also create appropriate natures for things [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: It isn't sufficient to say that God has made a general law, for in addition to the decree there has also to be a natural way of carrying it out. It is necessary, that is, that what happens should be explicable in terms of the God-given nature of things. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letter to the Editor about Bayle [1698], p.205) | |
| A reaction: Thus Leibniz is an ancestor of scientific essentialism, but he was too frightened to take the next step, which is to see that once God has endowed the natures, he doesn't need to wield his laws as well. The natures will do the whole job. |
| 13198 | Gravity is within matter because of its structure, and it can be explained. [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: I believe that both gravity and elasticity are in matter only because of the structure of the system and can be explained mechanically or through impulsion. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Thomas Burnett [1703], 1699 draft) | |
| A reaction: The significance of this remark is that gravity is held (in full knowledge of Newton's work) to be within matter, and not imposed from the outside. I believe we now postulate a particle as part of the explanation. |
| 13093 | The only permanence in things, constituting their substance, is a law of continuity [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: Nothing is permanent in things except the law itself, which involves a continuous succession ...The fact that a certain law persists ...is the very fact that constitutes the same substance. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Burcher De Volder [1706], 1704) | |
| A reaction: Aristotle and Leibniz are the very clear ancestors of modern scientific essentialism. I've left out a few inconvenient bits, about containing 'the whole universe', and containing all 'future states'. For Leibniz, laws are entirely rooted in things. |
| 7859 | Leibniz had an unusual commitment to the causal completeness of physics [Leibniz, by Papineau] |
| Full Idea: Unlike most philosophers prior to the twentieth century, Leibniz was committed to the causal completeness of physics. | |
| From: report of Gottfried Leibniz (works [1690]) by David Papineau - Thinking about Consciousness 1.4 | |
| A reaction: It has been suggested that Leibniz was actually, in private, a determinist (see Idea 7841), which would fit. Leibniz is enigmatic, but he may have proposed the closure of physics to glorify God, only to find that God was beginning to look irrelevant. |