6731
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No one can explain how matter affects mind, so matter is redundant in philosophy [Berkeley]
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Full Idea:
How matter should operate on a spirit, or produce any idea in it, is what no philosopher will pretend to explain; it is therefore evident there can be no use of matter in natural philosophy.
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From:
George Berkeley (The Principles of Human Knowledge [1710], §50)
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A reaction:
An intriguing argument for idealism, which starts in Cartesian dualism, but then discards the physical world because of the notorious interaction problem. Of course, if he had thought that matter and spirit were one (Spinoza) the problem vanishes.
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8153
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By knowing one piece of clay or gold, you know all of clay or gold [Anon (Upan)]
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Full Idea:
By knowing one lump of clay, all things made of clay are known; by knowing a nugget of gold, all things made of gold are known.
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From:
Anon (Upan) (The Upanishads [c.950 BCE], 'Chandogya')
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A reaction:
I can't think of a better basic definition of a natural kind. There is an inductive assumption, of course, which hits trouble when you meet fool's gold, or two different sorts of jade. But the concept of a natural kind is no more than this.
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6730
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We discover natural behaviour by observing settled laws of nature, not necessary connections [Berkeley]
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Full Idea:
That food nourishes, sleep refreshes, and fire warms us; all this we know, not by discovering any necessary connexion between our ideas, but only by the observation of the settled laws of nature.
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From:
George Berkeley (The Principles of Human Knowledge [1710], §31)
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A reaction:
Hume is famous for this idea, but it is found in Hobbes too (Idea 2364), and is the standard empiricist view of causation. The word 'settled' I take to imply that the laws are contingent, because they could become unsettled at any time.
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