Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Stilpo, Hilary Putnam and Armand Marie LeRoi

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4 ideas

26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 4. Source of Kinds
The hidden structure of a natural kind determines membership in all possible worlds [Putnam]
     Full Idea: If there is a hidden structure, then generally it determines what it is to be a member of the natural kind, ...in all possible worlds. Put another way, it determines what we can and cannot counterfactually suppose about the natural kind.
     From: Hilary Putnam (The Meaning of 'Meaning' [1975], p.241)
     A reaction: This is the arrival of the bold new view of natural kinds (which is actually the original view - see Idea 8153). One must be careful of the necessity here. There is causal context, vagueness etc.
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 5. Reference to Natural Kinds
Natural kind stereotypes are 'strong' (obvious, like tiger) or 'weak' (obscure, like molybdenum) [Putnam]
     Full Idea: Natural kinds can be associated with 'strong' stereotypes (giving a strong picture of a typical member, like a tiger), or with 'weak' stereotypes (with no idea of a sufficient condition, such as molybdenum or elm).
     From: Hilary Putnam (Explanation and Reference [1973], II C)
Express natural kinds as a posteriori predicate connections, not as singular terms [Putnam, by Mackie,P]
     Full Idea: Putnam implies dispensing with the designation of natural kinds by singular terms in favour of the postulation of necessary but a posteriori connections between predicates. ...We might call this 'predicate essentialism', but not 'de re essentialism'.
     From: report of Hilary Putnam (Explanation and Reference [1973]) by Penelope Mackie - How Things Might Have Been 10.1
     A reaction: It is characteristic of modern discussion that the logical form of natural kind statements is held to be crucial, rather than an account of nature in any old ways that do the job. So do I prefer singular terms, or predicate-connections. Hm.
"Water" is a natural kind term, but "H2O" is a description [Putnam]
     Full Idea: "Water" functions as a natural kind term, but "H2O" is a description, synonymous with an account of its atoms.
     From: Hilary Putnam (Representation and Reality [1988], §3 p.50)