8364
|
We can imagine controlling floods by controlling rain, but not vice versa [Wright,GHv]
|
|
Full Idea:
Given our present knowledge of the laws of nature, we can imagine ways of controlling floods by controlling rainfall, but not the other way round. That is should be so, however, is contingent.
|
|
From:
G.H. von Wright (Logic and Epistemology of Causal Relations [1973], §8)
|
|
A reaction:
Despite my objections to Idea 8363, this is a good example. It won't establish the metaphysics of the direction of causation, though, because God might control rainfall by controlling floods. Maybe causation is more like a motorway pile-up than dominoes.
|
8360
|
We must further analyse conditions for causation, into quantifiers or modal concepts [Wright,GHv]
|
|
Full Idea:
We may be able to analyse causation into conditionship relations between events or states of affairs, ...but conditions cannot be regarded as logical primitives, ... and must be analysed into quantifiers, or modal concepts.
|
|
From:
G.H. von Wright (Logic and Epistemology of Causal Relations [1973], §2)
|
|
A reaction:
[very compressed] A nice illustration of the aim of analytical philosophy - to analyse the elements of reality down to logical primitives. This is the dream of Descartes and Leibniz, continued by Russell and co. Do we still have this aspiration?
|
15251
|
The attribution of necessity to causation is either primitive animism, or confusion with logical necessity [Ayer]
|
|
Full Idea:
How are we to explain the word 'must' [about causation]? The answer is, I think, that it is either a relic of animism, or else reveals an inclination to treat causal connexion as if it were a form of logical necessity.
|
|
From:
A.J. Ayer (The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge [1940], IV.18)
|
|
A reaction:
The animism proposal just about makes sense (as a primitive feature of minds), but why would anyone, if they had the time and understanding, dream of treating a regular connection as a 'logical' necessity?
|
8365
|
Some laws are causal (Ohm's Law), but others are conceptual principles (conservation of energy) [Wright,GHv]
|
|
Full Idea:
Not all laws are causal 'experimentalist' laws, such as those for falling bodies, or the Gas Law, or Ohm's Law. Some are more like conceptual principles, giving a frame of reference, such as inertia, or conservation of energy, or the law of entropy.
|
|
From:
G.H. von Wright (Logic and Epistemology of Causal Relations [1973], §9)
|
|
A reaction:
An interesting and important distinction, whenever one is exploring the links between theories of causation and of laws of nature. If one wished to attack the whole concept of 'laws of nature', this might be a good place to start.
|