Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Anon (Ecc), Ren Descartes and Harr,R./Madden,E.H.
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25 ideas
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
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19676
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Nature is devoid of thought [Descartes, by Meillassoux]
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15987
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Physics only needs geometry or abstract mathematics, which can explain and demonstrate everything [Descartes]
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26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / a. Final purpose
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2280
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Many causes are quite baffling, so it is absurd to deduce causes from final purposes [Descartes]
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26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / c. Purpose denied
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12730
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We will not try to understand natural or divine ends, or final causes [Descartes]
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26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 4. Mathematical Nature
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24023
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All the sciences searching for order and measure are related to mathematics [Descartes]
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26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / f. Ancient elements
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16569
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The Hot, Cold, Wet and Dry of the philosophers need themselves to be explained [Descartes]
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26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 7. Later Matter Theories / c. Matter as extension
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16684
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Impenetrability only belongs to the essence of extension [Descartes]
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6518
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Matter can't just be Descartes's geometry, because a filler of the spaces is needed [Robinson,H on Descartes]
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16601
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Matter is not hard, heavy or coloured, but merely extended in space [Descartes]
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26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 6. Necessity of Kinds
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15292
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We can base the idea of a natural kind on the mechanisms that produce natural necessity [Harré/Madden]
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26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 7. Critique of Kinds
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15299
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Species do not have enough constancy to be natural kinds [Harré/Madden]
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
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15253
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If the concept of a cause includes its usual effects, we call it a 'power' [Harré/Madden]
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 5. Direction of causation
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15278
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Humean accounts of causal direction by time fail, because cause and effect can occur together [Harré/Madden]
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 6. Causation as primitive
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15246
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Active causal power is just objects at work, not something existing in itself [Harré/Madden]
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / a. Observation of causation
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15213
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Causation always involves particular productive things [Harré/Madden]
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / c. Conditions of causation
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2272
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There must be at least as much in the cause as there is in the effect [Descartes]
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15217
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Efficient causes combine stimulus to individuals, absence of contraints on activity [Harré/Madden]
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / d. Selecting the cause
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15277
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The cause (or part of it) is what stimulates or releases the powerful particular thing involved [Harré/Madden]
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26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 5. Laws from Universals
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15237
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Originally Humeans based lawlike statements on pure qualities, without particulars [Harré/Madden]
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26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 7. Strictness of Laws
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16686
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God has established laws throughout nature, and implanted ideas of them within us [Descartes]
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15238
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Being lawlike seems to resist formal analysis, because there are always counter-examples [Harré/Madden]
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26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / b. Scientific necessity
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15223
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Necessary effects will follow from some general theory specifying powers and structure of a world [Harré/Madden]
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15241
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Humeans say there is no necessity in causation, because denying an effect is never self-contradictory [Harré/Madden]
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26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / c. Essence and laws
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15240
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In lawful universal statements (unlike accidental ones) we see why the regularity holds [Harré/Madden]
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26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 11. Against Laws of Nature
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15239
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We could call any generalisation a law, if it had reasonable support and no counter-evidence [Harré/Madden]
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