Combining Philosophers

Ideas for B Hale / C Wright, Immanuel Kant and J.L. Mackie

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15 ideas

26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / a. Observation of causation
8337 Some says mental causation is distinct because we can recognise single occurrences [Mackie]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
14560 A ball denting a pillow seems like simultaneous cause and effect, though time identifies which is cause [Kant]
8342 Mackie tries to analyse singular causal statements, but his entities are too vague for events [Kim on Mackie]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / c. Conditions of causation
8343 Necessity and sufficiency are best suited to properties and generic events, not individual events [Kim on Mackie]
8385 A cause is part of a wider set of conditions which suffices for its effect [Mackie, by Crane]
8335 Necessary conditions are like counterfactuals, and sufficient conditions are like factual conditionals [Mackie]
8336 The INUS account interprets single events, and sequences, causally, without laws being known [Mackie]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / d. Selecting the cause
8333 A cause is an Insufficient but Necessary part of an Unnecessary but Sufficient condition [Mackie]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / a. Constant conjunction
5545 Appearances give rules of what usually happens, but cause involves necessity [Kant]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
8395 Mackie has a nomological account of general causes, and a subjunctive conditional account of single ones [Mackie, by Tooley]
8334 The virus causes yellow fever, and is 'the' cause; sweets cause tooth decay, but they are not 'the' cause [Mackie]
9755 The concept of causality entails laws; random causality is a contradiction [Kant, by Korsgaard]
17709 We judge causation by relating events together by some law of nature [Kant, by Mares]
5562 Experience is only possible because we subject appearances to causal laws [Kant]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
5523 Causation obviously involves necessity, so it cannot just be frequent association [Kant]