Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Critolaus, Harr�,R./Madden,E.H. and S.Mumford/R.Lill Anjum
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34 ideas
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 6. Necessity of Kinds
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15292
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We can base the idea of a natural kind on the mechanisms that produce natural necessity [Harré/Madden]
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26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 7. Critique of Kinds
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15299
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Species do not have enough constancy to be natural kinds [Harré/Madden]
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
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14566
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Causation by absence is not real causation, but part of our explanatory practices [Mumford/Anjum]
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14577
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Causation may not be transitive. Does a fire cause itself to be extinguished by the sprinklers? [Mumford/Anjum]
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
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15253
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If the concept of a cause includes its usual effects, we call it a 'power' [Harré/Madden]
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation
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14563
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Causation is the passing around of powers [Mumford/Anjum]
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 5. Direction of causation
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15278
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Humean accounts of causal direction by time fail, because cause and effect can occur together [Harré/Madden]
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 6. Causation as primitive
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15246
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Active causal power is just objects at work, not something existing in itself [Harré/Madden]
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14587
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We take causation to be primitive, as it is hard to see how it could be further reduced [Mumford/Anjum]
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / a. Observation of causation
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15213
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Causation always involves particular productive things [Harré/Madden]
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
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14533
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Causation doesn't have two distinct relata; it is a single unfolding process [Mumford/Anjum]
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14558
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A collision is a process, which involves simultaneous happenings, but not instantaneous ones [Mumford/Anjum]
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14559
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Does causation need a third tying ingredient, or just two that meet, or might there be a single process? [Mumford/Anjum]
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14565
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Sugar dissolving is a process taking time, not one event and then another [Mumford/Anjum]
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / c. Conditions of causation
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15217
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Efficient causes combine stimulus to individuals, absence of contraints on activity [Harré/Madden]
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / d. Selecting the cause
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15277
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The cause (or part of it) is what stimulates or releases the powerful particular thing involved [Harré/Madden]
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14567
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Privileging one cause is just an epistemic or pragmatic matter, not an ontological one [Mumford/Anjum]
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / a. Constant conjunction
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14537
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Coincidence is conjunction without causation; smoking causing cancer is the reverse [Mumford/Anjum]
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
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14573
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Occasionally a cause makes no difference (pre-emption, perhaps) so the counterfactual is false [Mumford/Anjum]
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14572
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Is a cause because of counterfactual dependence, or is the dependence because there is a cause? [Mumford/Anjum]
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14574
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Cases of preventing a prevention may give counterfactual dependence without causation [Mumford/Anjum]
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
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14539
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Nature can be interfered with, so a cause never necessitates its effects [Mumford/Anjum]
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14550
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We assert causes without asserting that they necessitate their effects [Mumford/Anjum]
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14546
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Necessary causation should survive antecedent strengthening, but no cause can always survive that [Mumford/Anjum]
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26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 5. Laws from Universals
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15237
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Originally Humeans based lawlike statements on pure qualities, without particulars [Harré/Madden]
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26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 7. Strictness of Laws
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15238
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Being lawlike seems to resist formal analysis, because there are always counter-examples [Harré/Madden]
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14575
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A 'ceteris paribus' clause implies that a conditional only has dispositional force [Mumford/Anjum]
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26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / b. Scientific necessity
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15223
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Necessary effects will follow from some general theory specifying powers and structure of a world [Harré/Madden]
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15241
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Humeans say there is no necessity in causation, because denying an effect is never self-contradictory [Harré/Madden]
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14548
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There may be necessitation in the world, but causation does not supply it [Mumford/Anjum]
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26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / c. Essence and laws
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15240
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In lawful universal statements (unlike accidental ones) we see why the regularity holds [Harré/Madden]
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26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 11. Against Laws of Nature
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15239
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We could call any generalisation a law, if it had reasonable support and no counter-evidence [Harré/Madden]
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14554
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Laws are nothing more than descriptions of the behaviour of powers [Mumford/Anjum]
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14564
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If laws are equations, cause and effect must be simultaneous (or the law would be falsified)! [Mumford/Anjum]
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