Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Dennis Whitcomb, Thomas Reid and Stathis Psillos
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23 ideas
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
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4403
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We can't base our account of causation on explanation, because it is the wrong way round [Psillos]
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23632
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Similar effects come from similar causes, and causes are only what are sufficient for the effects [Reid]
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4399
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Causes clearly make a difference, are recipes for events, explain effects, and are evidence [Psillos]
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4400
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Theories of causation are based either on regularity, or on intrinsic relations of properties [Psillos]
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
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4789
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Three divisions of causal theories: generalist/singularist, intrinsic/extrinsic, reductive/non-reductive [Psillos]
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
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4790
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If causation is 'intrinsic' it depends entirely on the properties and relations of the cause and effect [Psillos]
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / a. Constant conjunction
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8383
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Day and night are constantly conjoined, but they don't cause one another [Reid, by Crane]
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23677
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We all know that mere priority or constant conjunction do not have to imply causation [Reid]
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
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4402
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Empiricists tried to reduce causation to explanation, which they reduced to logic-plus-a-law [Psillos]
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
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4774
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Counterfactual claims about causation imply that it is more than just regular succession [Psillos]
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
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23667
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Regular events don't imply a cause, without an innate conviction of universal causation [Reid]
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26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
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23679
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The principle of the law of nature is that matter is passive, and is acted upon [Reid]
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23670
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Scientists don't know the cause of magnetism, and only discover its regulations [Reid]
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23671
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Laws are rules for effects, but these need a cause; rules of navigation don't navigate [Reid]
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26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 3. Laws and Generalities
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4793
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"All gold cubes are smaller than one cubic mile" is a true universal generalisation, but not a law [Psillos]
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26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
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4397
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Regularity doesn't seem sufficient for causation [Psillos]
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4792
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A Humean view of causation says it is regularities, and causal facts supervene on non-causal facts [Psillos]
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4801
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The regularity of a cock's crow is used to predict dawn, even though it doesn't cause it [Psillos]
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4401
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It is not a law of nature that all the coins in my pocket are euros, though it is a regularity [Psillos]
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26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / b. Best system theory
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4796
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Laws are sets of regularities within a simple and strong coherent system of wider regularities [Psillos]
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26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / e. Anti scientific essentialism
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4799
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Dispositional essentialism can't explain its key distinction between essential and non-essential properties [Psillos]
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26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 9. Counterfactual Claims
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4780
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In some counterfactuals, the counterfactual event happens later than its consequent [Psillos]
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4791
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Counterfactual theories say causes make a difference - if c hadn't occurred, then e wouldn't occur [Psillos]
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