display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
38 ideas
8873 | The cause of a usage determines meaning, but why is the microstructure of water relevant? [Davidson] |
10371 | Distinguish causation, which is in the world, from explanations, which depend on descriptions [Davidson, by Schaffer,J] |
15562 | Causation is a general relation derived from instances of causal dependence [Lewis] |
15555 | Explaining match lighting in general is like explaining one lighting of a match [Lewis] |
8405 | A theory of causation should explain why cause precedes effect, not take it for granted [Lewis, by Field,H] |
8427 | I reject making the direction of causation axiomatic, since that takes too much for granted [Lewis] |
8433 | There are few traces of an event before it happens, but many afterwards [Lewis, by Horwich] |
8403 | Either facts, or highly unspecific events, serve better as causes than concrete events [Field,H on Davidson] |
3524 | Causation is either between events, or between descriptions of events [Davidson, by Maslin] |
3526 | Whether an event is a causal explanation depends on how it is described [Davidson, by Maslin] |
8346 | Full descriptions can demonstrate sufficiency of cause, but not necessity [Davidson] |
10392 | It is just individious discrimination to pick out one cause and label it as 'the' cause [Lewis] |
8419 | The modern regularity view says a cause is a member of a minimal set of sufficient conditions [Lewis] |
15551 | Ways of carving causes may be natural, but never 'right' [Lewis] |
15552 | We only pick 'the' cause for the purposes of some particular enquiry. [Lewis] |
8421 | Regularity analyses could make c an effect of e, or an epiphenomenon, or inefficacious, or pre-empted [Lewis] |
4778 | A singular causal statement is true if it is held to fall under a law [Davidson, by Psillos] |
3962 | Cause and effect relations between events must follow strict laws [Davidson] |
17525 | The counterfactual view says causes are necessary (rather than sufficient) for their effects [Lewis, by Bird] |
17524 | Lewis has basic causation, counterfactuals, and a general ancestral (thus handling pre-emption) [Lewis, by Bird] |
8397 | Counterfactual causation implies all laws are causal, which they aren't [Tooley on Lewis] |
8423 | My counterfactual analysis applies to particular cases, not generalisations [Lewis] |
8426 | One event causes another iff there is a causal chain from first to second [Lewis] |
15553 | Causal dependence is counterfactual dependence between events [Lewis] |
8608 | Counterfactuals 'backtrack' if a different present implies a different past [Lewis] |
8584 | Causal counterfactuals must avoid backtracking, to avoid epiphenomena and preemption [Lewis] |
9659 | Causation is when at the closest world without the cause, there is no effect either [Lewis] |
8581 | Physics discovers laws and causal explanations, and also the natural properties required [Lewis] |
15727 | Physics aims for a list of natural properties [Lewis] |
9409 | Laws are the best axiomatization of the total history of world events or facts [Lewis, by Mumford] |
9419 | A law of nature is a general axiom of the deductive system that is best for simplicity and strength [Lewis] |
9423 | If simplicity and strength are criteria for laws of nature, that introduces a subjective element [Mumford on Lewis] |
9424 | A number of systematizations might tie as the best and most coherent system [Mumford on Lewis] |
9425 | Lewis later proposed the axioms at the intersection of the best theories (which may be few) [Mumford on Lewis] |
8611 | A law of nature is any regularity that earns inclusion in the ideal system [Lewis] |
4398 | An event causes another just if the second event would not have happened without the first [Lewis, by Psillos] |
4795 | Lewis's account of counterfactuals is fine if we know what a law of nature is, but it won't explain the latter [Cohen,LJ on Lewis] |
9426 | The world is just a vast mosaic of little matters of local particular fact [Lewis] |