Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Epicharmus, Harr�,R./Madden,E.H. and Ralph Waldo Emerson
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14 ideas
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 6. Necessity of Kinds
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15292
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We can base the idea of a natural kind on the mechanisms that produce natural necessity [Harré/Madden]
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26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 7. Critique of Kinds
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15299
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Species do not have enough constancy to be natural kinds [Harré/Madden]
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
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15253
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If the concept of a cause includes its usual effects, we call it a 'power' [Harré/Madden]
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 5. Direction of causation
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15278
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Humean accounts of causal direction by time fail, because cause and effect can occur together [Harré/Madden]
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 6. Causation as primitive
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15246
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Active causal power is just objects at work, not something existing in itself [Harré/Madden]
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / a. Observation of causation
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15213
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Causation always involves particular productive things [Harré/Madden]
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / c. Conditions of causation
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15217
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Efficient causes combine stimulus to individuals, absence of contraints on activity [Harré/Madden]
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / d. Selecting the cause
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15277
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The cause (or part of it) is what stimulates or releases the powerful particular thing involved [Harré/Madden]
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26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 5. Laws from Universals
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15237
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Originally Humeans based lawlike statements on pure qualities, without particulars [Harré/Madden]
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26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 7. Strictness of Laws
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15238
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Being lawlike seems to resist formal analysis, because there are always counter-examples [Harré/Madden]
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26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / b. Scientific necessity
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15223
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Necessary effects will follow from some general theory specifying powers and structure of a world [Harré/Madden]
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15241
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Humeans say there is no necessity in causation, because denying an effect is never self-contradictory [Harré/Madden]
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26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / c. Essence and laws
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15240
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In lawful universal statements (unlike accidental ones) we see why the regularity holds [Harré/Madden]
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26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 11. Against Laws of Nature
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15239
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We could call any generalisation a law, if it had reasonable support and no counter-evidence [Harré/Madden]
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