Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Lycophron, David M. Armstrong and Moses Maimonides
expand these ideas
|
start again
|
choose
another area for these philosophers
display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
16 ideas
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / e. The One
17692
|
We can't deduce the phenomena from the One [Armstrong]
|
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
17689
|
Absences might be effects, but surely not causes? [Armstrong]
|
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation
18380
|
Negative causations supervene on positive causations plus their laws? [Armstrong]
|
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
4798
|
In recent writings, Armstrong makes a direct identification of necessitation with causation [Armstrong, by Psillos]
|
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
17682
|
A universe couldn't consist of mere laws [Armstrong]
|
17662
|
Science depends on laws of nature to study unobserved times and spaces [Armstrong]
|
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 2. Types of Laws
17690
|
Oaken conditional laws, Iron universal laws, and Steel necessary laws [Armstrong, by PG]
|
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 3. Laws and Generalities
17670
|
Newton's First Law refers to bodies not acted upon by a force, but there may be no such body [Armstrong]
|
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
8582
|
Regularities are lawful if a second-order universal unites two first-order universals [Armstrong, by Lewis]
|
17671
|
A naive regularity view says if it never occurs then it is impossible [Armstrong]
|
8541
|
Regularities theories are poor on causal connections, counterfactuals and probability [Armstrong]
|
8540
|
The introduction of sparse properties avoids the regularity theory's problem with 'grue' [Armstrong]
|
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 5. Laws from Universals
17681
|
The laws of nature link properties with properties [Armstrong]
|
16246
|
Rather than take necessitation between universals as primitive, just make laws primitive [Maudlin on Armstrong]
|
9480
|
Armstrong has an unclear notion of contingent necessitation, which can't necessitate anything [Bird on Armstrong]
|
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / e. Anti scientific essentialism
5492
|
How can essences generate the right powers to vary with distance between objects? [Armstrong]
|