Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM, Alexander Bird and Stephen Mumford

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67 ideas

26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 1. Natural Kinds
6767 Rubies and sapphires are both corundum, with traces of metals varying their colours [Bird]
6768 Tin is not one natural kind, but appears to be 21, depending on isotope [Bird]
6770 Membership of a purely random collection cannot be used as an explanation [Bird]
6771 Natural kinds may overlap, or be sub-kinds of one another [Bird]
6776 Natural kinds are those that we use in induction [Bird]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 2. Defining Kinds
6773 If F is a universal appearing in a natural law, then Fs form a natural kind [Bird]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 3. Knowing Kinds
6769 In the Kripke-Putnam view only nuclear physicists can know natural kinds [Bird]
6774 Darwinism suggests that we should have a native ability to detect natural kinds [Bird]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 4. Source of Kinds
14344 Natural kinds, such as electrons, all behave the same way because we divide them by dispositions [Mumford]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 5. Reference to Natural Kinds
6764 Nominal essence of a natural kind is the features that make it fit its name [Bird]
6766 Jadeite and nephrite are superficially identical, but have different composition [Bird]
6808 Reference to scientific terms is by explanatory role, not by descriptions [Bird]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
19068 Causation interests us because we want to explain change [Mumford]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
17528 The dispositional account explains causation, as stimulation and manifestation of dispositions [Bird]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation
9493 We should explain causation by powers, not powers by causation [Bird]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
6753 Laws are more fundamental in science than causes, and laws will explain causes [Bird]
9494 Singularism about causes is wrong, as the universals involved imply laws [Bird]
9430 Singular causes, and identities, might be necessary without falling under a law [Mumford]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
9445 We can give up the counterfactual account if we take causal language at face value [Mumford]
17526 The counterfactual approach makes no distinction between cause and pre-condition [Bird]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
9443 It is only properties which are the source of necessity in the world [Mumford]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
14338 In the 'laws' view events are basic, and properties are categorical, only existing when manifested [Mumford]
9444 There are four candidates for the logical form of law statements [Mumford]
6762 Newton's laws cannot be confirmed individually, but only in combinations [Bird]
6763 Parapsychology is mere speculation, because it offers no mechanisms for its working [Bird]
6772 Existence requires laws, as inertia or gravity are needed for mass or matter [Bird]
9507 Laws are explanatory relationships of things, which supervene on their essences [Bird]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 2. Types of Laws
9488 Laws are either disposition regularities, or relations between properties [Bird]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 3. Laws and Generalities
14339 Without laws, how can a dispositionalist explain general behaviour within kinds? [Mumford]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
14340 It is a regularity that whenever a person sneezes, someone (somewhere) promptly coughs [Mumford]
14341 Dretske and Armstrong base laws on regularities between individual properties, not between events [Mumford]
9415 Would it count as a regularity if the only five As were also B? [Mumford]
9416 Regularities are more likely with few instances, and guaranteed with no instances! [Mumford]
9431 Pure regularities are rare, usually only found in idealized conditions [Mumford]
9441 Regularity laws don't explain, because they have no governing role [Mumford]
6746 There may be many laws, each with only a few instances [Bird]
6740 'All uranium lumps are small' is a law, but 'all gold lumps are small' is not [Bird]
6741 There can be remarkable uniformities in nature that are purely coincidental [Bird]
6742 A law might have no instances, if it was about things that only exist momentarily [Bird]
6743 If laws are just instances, the law should either have gaps, or join the instances arbitrarily [Bird]
6744 Where is the regularity in a law predicting nuclear decay? [Bird]
6747 Laws cannot explain instances if they are regularities, as something can't explain itself [Bird]
6748 Similar appearance of siblings is a regularity, but shared parents is what links them [Bird]
6749 We can only infer a true regularity if something binds the instances together [Bird]
6801 Accidental regularities are not laws, and an apparent regularity may not be actual [Bird]
6803 If we only infer laws from regularities among observations, we can't infer unobservable entities. [Bird]
9496 That other diamonds are hard does not explain why this one is [Bird]
9479 Dispositional essentialism says laws (and laws about laws) are guaranteed regularities [Bird]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / b. Best system theory
9422 If the best system describes a nomological system, the laws are in nature, not in the description [Mumford]
9421 The best systems theory says regularities derive from laws, rather than constituting them [Mumford]
6745 A regularity is only a law if it is part of a complete system which is simple and strong [Bird]
6802 With strange enough predicates, anything could be made out to be a regularity [Bird]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 5. Laws from Universals
9433 If laws can be uninstantiated, this favours the view of them as connecting universals [Mumford]
9432 Laws of nature are necessary relations between universal properties, rather than about particulars [Mumford]
9473 Laws cannot offer unified explanations if they don't involve universals [Bird]
9484 If the universals for laws must be instantiated, a vanishing particular could destroy a law [Bird]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / b. Scientific necessity
14345 The necessity of an electron being an electron is conceptual, and won't ground necessary laws [Mumford]
9506 Salt necessarily dissolves in water, because of the law which makes the existence of salt possible [Bird]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / c. Essence and laws
9434 Laws of nature are just the possession of essential properties by natural kinds [Mumford]
23713 Most laws supervene on fundamental laws, which are explained by basic powers [Bird, by Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / d. Knowing essences
14307 Some dispositions are so far unknown, until we learn how to manifest them [Mumford]
9437 To distinguish accidental from essential properties, we must include possible members of kinds [Mumford]
6789 If flame colour is characteristic of a metal, that is an empirical claim needing justification [Bird]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 9. Counterfactual Claims
9489 Essentialism can't use conditionals to explain regularities, because of possible interventions [Bird]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 11. Against Laws of Nature
9412 You only need laws if you (erroneously) think the world is otherwise inert [Mumford]
9411 There are no laws of nature in Aristotle; they became standard with Descartes and Newton [Mumford]
9439 The Central Dilemma is how to explain an internal or external view of laws which govern [Mumford]