Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM, J.L. Mackie and E.J. Lowe
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16 ideas
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 5. Direction of causation
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4210
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If the concept of a cause says it precedes its effect, that rules out backward causation by definition [Lowe]
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / a. Observation of causation
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8337
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Some says mental causation is distinct because we can recognise single occurrences [Mackie]
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
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8342
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Mackie tries to analyse singular causal statements, but his entities are too vague for events [Kim on Mackie]
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4209
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The theories of fact causation and event causation are both worth serious consideration [Lowe]
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8317
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To cite facts as the elements in causation is to confuse states of affairs with states of objects [Lowe]
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4215
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It seems proper to say that only substances (rather than events) have causal powers [Lowe]
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / c. Conditions of causation
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8343
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Necessity and sufficiency are best suited to properties and generic events, not individual events [Kim on Mackie]
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8385
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A cause is part of a wider set of conditions which suffices for its effect [Mackie, by Crane]
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8335
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Necessary conditions are like counterfactuals, and sufficient conditions are like factual conditionals [Mackie]
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8336
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The INUS account interprets single events, and sequences, causally, without laws being known [Mackie]
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4211
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Causal overdetermination is either actual overdetermination, or pre-emption, or the fail-safe case [Lowe]
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / d. Selecting the cause
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8333
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A cause is an Insufficient but Necessary part of an Unnecessary but Sufficient condition [Mackie]
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
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8395
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Mackie has a nomological account of general causes, and a subjunctive conditional account of single ones [Mackie, by Tooley]
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8334
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The virus causes yellow fever, and is 'the' cause; sweets cause tooth decay, but they are not 'the' cause [Mackie]
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4213
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Causation may be instances of laws (seen either as constant conjunctions, or as necessities) [Lowe]
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
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4212
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Hume showed that causation could at most be natural necessity, never metaphysical necessity [Lowe]
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