Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM, Robert Pasnau and J.L. Mackie
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15 ideas
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / g. Atomism
16609
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Atomists say causation is mechanical collisions, and all true qualities are microscopic [Pasnau]
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26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 7. Later Matter Theories / a. Early Modern matter
16603
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In the 17th C matter became body, and was then studied by science [Pasnau]
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26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 7. Later Matter Theories / b. Corpuscles
16592
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Atomism is the commonest version of corpuscularianism, but isn't required by it [Pasnau]
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16750
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If there are just arrangements of corpuscles, where are the boundaries between substances? [Pasnau]
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
16722
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Scholastic causation is by changes in the primary qualities of hot, cold, wet, dry [Pasnau]
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / a. Observation of causation
8337
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Some says mental causation is distinct because we can recognise single occurrences [Mackie]
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
8342
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Mackie tries to analyse singular causal statements, but his entities are too vague for events [Kim on Mackie]
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / c. Conditions of causation
8343
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Necessity and sufficiency are best suited to properties and generic events, not individual events [Kim on Mackie]
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8385
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A cause is part of a wider set of conditions which suffices for its effect [Mackie, by Crane]
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8335
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Necessary conditions are like counterfactuals, and sufficient conditions are like factual conditionals [Mackie]
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8336
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The INUS account interprets single events, and sequences, causally, without laws being known [Mackie]
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / d. Selecting the cause
8333
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A cause is an Insufficient but Necessary part of an Unnecessary but Sufficient condition [Mackie]
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
8395
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Mackie has a nomological account of general causes, and a subjunctive conditional account of single ones [Mackie, by Tooley]
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8334
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The virus causes yellow fever, and is 'the' cause; sweets cause tooth decay, but they are not 'the' cause [Mackie]
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26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
16760
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Substantial forms were a step towards scientific essentialism [Pasnau]
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