display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
3 ideas
| 14588 | Modern metaphysicians tend to think space-time points are more fundamental than space-time regions [Hawthorne] |
| Full Idea: Nowadays it is common for metaphysicians to hold both that space-time regions are less fundamental than the space-time points that compose them, and that facts about the regions are less fundamental than facts about the points and their arrangements. | |
| From: John Hawthorne (Three-Dimensionalism v Four-Dimensionalism [2008], 1) | |
| A reaction: I'm not quite sure what a physicist would make of this. It seems to be motivated by some a priori preference for atomism, and for system-building from minimal foundations. |
| 4226 | If three regions 'freeze' every three, four and five years, after sixty years everything stops for a year [Shoemaker, by Lowe] |
| Full Idea: If region A has a year's 'freeze' every three years, region B does it every four years, and C every five years, every sixty years they would all freeze, and there would be no witnesses. The simplest hypothesis is that a year passes with no events. | |
| From: report of Sydney Shoemaker (Time Without Change [1969]) by E.J. Lowe - A Survey of Metaphysics p.247 | |
| A reaction: Lovely argument. I definitely vote for there being a year of time with no events, even though it contradicats Einstein and the rest. As usual, we should be doing ontology, but get lured into epistemology. |
| 8595 | If three regions freeze every 3rd, 4th and 5th year, they all freeze together every 60 years [Shoemaker] |
| Full Idea: If region A locally freezes (for one year, observed by the other two regions) every third year, and region B every fourth year, and region B every fifth year, ...then every sixtieth year there will be a total freeze lasting one year. | |
| From: Sydney Shoemaker (Time Without Change [1969], p.56) | |
| A reaction: One of the most brilliant thought experiments in modern philosophy!!! He demonstrates that there can be time without change, but also that we must rely on best explanation, and that there is more to ontology than epistemology (let alone semantics). |