Combining Philosophers
Ideas for B Hale / C Wright, Hermann von Helmholtz and Robin Le Poidevin
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31 ideas
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / e. Eventless time
22917
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Since nothing occurs in a temporal vacuum, there is no way to measure its length [Le Poidevin]
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22921
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Temporal vacuums would be unexperienced, unmeasured, and unending [Le Poidevin]
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27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / g. Growing block
15195
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If the future is not real, we don't seem to have any obligation to future individuals [Le Poidevin]
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27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / h. Presentism
15188
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If things don't persist through time, then change makes no sense [Le Poidevin]
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27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / b. Rate of time
22934
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Time can't speed up or slow down, so it doesn't seem to be a 'process' [Le Poidevin]
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27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / c. Tenses and time
15191
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At the very least, minds themselves seem to be tensed [Le Poidevin]
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15197
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Fiction seems to lack a tensed perspective, and offers an example of tenseless language [Le Poidevin]
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15206
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It is the view of the future that really decides between tensed and tenseless views of time [Le Poidevin]
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27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / d. Time series
15198
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In the B-series, time-positions are unchanging; in the A-series they change (from future to present to past) [Le Poidevin]
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15189
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Things which have ceased change their A-series position; things that persist change their B-series position [Le Poidevin]
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6865
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A-theory says past, present, future and flow exist; B-theory says this just reports our perspective [Le Poidevin]
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27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / e. Tensed (A) series
15187
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It is claimed that the tense view entails the unreality of both future and past [Le Poidevin]
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15205
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Tensed theorists typically try to reduce the tenseless to the tensed [Le Poidevin]
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15192
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We share a common now, but not a common here [Le Poidevin]
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27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / f. Tenseless (B) series
15193
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The new tenseless theory offers indexical truth-conditions, instead of a reductive analysis [Le Poidevin]
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22938
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To say that the past causes the present needs them both to be equally real [Le Poidevin]
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22939
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The B-series doesn't seem to allow change [Le Poidevin]
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22940
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If the B-universe is eternal, why am I trapped in a changing moment of it? [Le Poidevin]
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27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / g. Time's arrow
22953
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Time's arrow is not causal if there is no temporal gap between cause and effect [Le Poidevin]
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22947
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An ordered series can be undirected, but time favours moving from earlier to later [Le Poidevin]
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22952
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If time's arrow is causal, how can there be non-simultaneous events that are causally unconnected? [Le Poidevin]
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22951
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If time's arrow is psychological then different minds can impose different orders on events [Le Poidevin]
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22948
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There are Thermodynamic, Psychological and Causal arrows of time [Le Poidevin]
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22949
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Presumably if time's arrow is thermodynamic then time ends when entropy is complete [Le Poidevin]
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22950
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If time is thermodynamic then entropy is necessary - but the theory says it is probable [Le Poidevin]
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27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / i. Time and motion
22943
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Instantaneous motion is an intrinsic disposition to be elsewhere [Le Poidevin]
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22945
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The dynamic view of motion says it is primitive, and not reducible to objects, properties and times [Le Poidevin]
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27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / k. Temporal truths
22937
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If the present could have diverse pasts, then past truths can't have present truthmakers [Le Poidevin]
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27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / a. Beginning of time
22925
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The present is the past/future boundary, so the first moment of time was not present [Le Poidevin]
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27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / c. Intervals
22944
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The primitive parts of time are intervals, not instants [Le Poidevin]
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27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / e. Present moment
22942
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If time is infinitely divisible, then the present must be infinitely short [Le Poidevin]
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