Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Mohammed, Kretzmann/Stump and Robin Le Poidevin

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37 ideas

27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 3. Points in Space
22922 We can identify unoccupied points in space, so they must exist [Le Poidevin]
22924 If spatial points exist, then they must be stationary, by definition [Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 4. Substantival Space
22923 Absolute space explains actual and potential positions, and geometrical truths [Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 5. Relational Space
22928 For relationists moving an object beyond the edge of space creates new space [Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 6. Space-Time
22931 We distinguish time from space, because it passes, and it has a unique present moment [Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / e. Eventless time
22917 Since nothing occurs in a temporal vacuum, there is no way to measure its length [Le Poidevin]
22921 Temporal vacuums would be unexperienced, unmeasured, and unending [Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / g. Growing block
15195 If the future is not real, we don't seem to have any obligation to future individuals [Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / h. Presentism
15188 If things don't persist through time, then change makes no sense [Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / b. Rate of time
22934 Time can't speed up or slow down, so it doesn't seem to be a 'process' [Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / c. Tenses and time
15191 At the very least, minds themselves seem to be tensed [Le Poidevin]
15197 Fiction seems to lack a tensed perspective, and offers an example of tenseless language [Le Poidevin]
15206 It is the view of the future that really decides between tensed and tenseless views of time [Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / d. Time series
15198 In the B-series, time-positions are unchanging; in the A-series they change (from future to present to past) [Le Poidevin]
15189 Things which have ceased change their A-series position; things that persist change their B-series position [Le Poidevin]
6865 A-theory says past, present, future and flow exist; B-theory says this just reports our perspective [Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / e. Tensed (A) series
15187 It is claimed that the tense view entails the unreality of both future and past [Le Poidevin]
15205 Tensed theorists typically try to reduce the tenseless to the tensed [Le Poidevin]
15192 We share a common now, but not a common here [Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / f. Tenseless (B) series
15193 The new tenseless theory offers indexical truth-conditions, instead of a reductive analysis [Le Poidevin]
22938 To say that the past causes the present needs them both to be equally real [Le Poidevin]
22939 The B-series doesn't seem to allow change [Le Poidevin]
22940 If the B-universe is eternal, why am I trapped in a changing moment of it? [Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / g. Time's arrow
22947 An ordered series can be undirected, but time favours moving from earlier to later [Le Poidevin]
22952 If time's arrow is causal, how can there be non-simultaneous events that are causally unconnected? [Le Poidevin]
22953 Time's arrow is not causal if there is no temporal gap between cause and effect [Le Poidevin]
22951 If time's arrow is psychological then different minds can impose different orders on events [Le Poidevin]
22948 There are Thermodynamic, Psychological and Causal arrows of time [Le Poidevin]
22949 Presumably if time's arrow is thermodynamic then time ends when entropy is complete [Le Poidevin]
22950 If time is thermodynamic then entropy is necessary - but the theory says it is probable [Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / i. Time and motion
22943 Instantaneous motion is an intrinsic disposition to be elsewhere [Le Poidevin]
22945 The dynamic view of motion says it is primitive, and not reducible to objects, properties and times [Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / k. Temporal truths
22937 If the present could have diverse pasts, then past truths can't have present truthmakers [Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / a. Beginning of time
22925 The present is the past/future boundary, so the first moment of time was not present [Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / c. Intervals
22944 The primitive parts of time are intervals, not instants [Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / e. Present moment
22942 If time is infinitely divisible, then the present must be infinitely short [Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 10. Multiverse
22946 The multiverse is distinct time-series, as well as spaces [Le Poidevin]