Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Sophocles, Novalis and Baron,S/Miller,K
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27 ideas
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 2. Thermodynamics / d. Entropy
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23009
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There is no second 'law' of thermodynamics; it just reflects probabilities of certain microstates [Baron/Miller]
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27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 6. Space-Time
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23002
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In relativity space and time depend on one's motion, but spacetime gives an invariant metric [Baron/Miller]
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27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / f. Eternalism
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22988
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The block universe theory says entities of all times exist, and time is the B-series [Baron/Miller]
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27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / g. Growing block
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22991
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How can we know this is the present moment, if other times are real? [Baron/Miller]
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22992
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If we are actually in the past then we shouldn't experience time passing [Baron/Miller]
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27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / h. Presentism
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22994
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Erzatz Presentism allows the existence of other times, with only the present 'actualised' [Baron/Miller]
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22998
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How do presentists explain relations between things existing at different times? [Baron/Miller]
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23017
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Presentism needs endurantism, because other theories imply most of the object doesn't exist [Baron/Miller]
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23023
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How can presentists move to the next future moment, if that doesn't exist? [Baron/Miller]
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27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / i. Denying time
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22995
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Most of the sciences depend on the concept of time [Baron/Miller]
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27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / a. Experience of time
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22993
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For abstractionists past times might still exist, althought their objects don't [Baron/Miller]
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23001
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The error theory of time's passage says it is either a misdescription or a false inference [Baron/Miller]
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27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / b. Rate of time
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22999
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It is meaningless to measure the rate of time using time itself, and without a rate there is no flow [Baron/Miller]
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27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / d. Time series
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22986
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The C-series rejects A and B, and just sees times as order by betweenness, without direction [Baron/Miller]
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27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / e. Tensed (A) series
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22996
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The A-series has to treat being past, present or future as properties [Baron/Miller]
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27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / f. Tenseless (B) series
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23007
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The B-series can have a direction, as long as it does not arise from temporal flow [Baron/Miller]
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27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / g. Time's arrow
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23003
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Static theories cannot account for time's obvious asymmetry, so time must be dynamic [Baron/Miller]
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23004
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The direction of time is either primitive, or reducible to something else [Baron/Miller]
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23005
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The kaon does not seem to be time-reversal invariant, unlike the rest of nature [Baron/Miller]
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23006
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Maybe the past is just the direction of decreasing entropy [Baron/Miller]
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23010
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We could explain time's direction by causation: past is the direction of causes, future of effects [Baron/Miller]
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27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / h. Change in time
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22989
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Static time theory presents change as one property at t1, and a different property at t2 [Baron/Miller]
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27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / j. Time travel
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23020
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If a time traveller kills his youthful grandfather, he both exists and fails to exist [Baron/Miller]
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23022
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Presentism means there no existing past for a time traveller to visit [Baron/Miller]
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27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / k. Temporal truths
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22987
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The past (unlike the future) is fixed, along with truths about it, by the existence of past objects [Baron/Miller]
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27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / e. Present moment
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22990
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The moving spotlight says entities can have properties of being present, past or future [Baron/Miller]
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22997
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The present moment is a matter of existence, not of acquiring a property [Baron/Miller]
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