Combining Philosophers

Ideas for John Buridan, John Locke and Alfred North Whitehead

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3 ideas

28. God / B. Proving God / 1. Proof of God
God has given us no innate idea of himself [Locke]
     Full Idea: God has given us no innate idea of himself.
     From: John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 4.10.01)
     A reaction: This is rejection of Descartes' 'Trademark Argument' (Idea 2274). It is consistent with Locke's general assault on all innate ideas, as you might expect from an empiricist.
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / a. Cosmological Proof
We exist, so there is Being, which requires eternal being [Locke]
     Full Idea: Everyone's certain knowledge assures him that he is something that actually exists. ...Therefore there is some real Being, and since non-entity cannot produce any real being, it is an evident demonstration that from Eternity there has been something.
     From: John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 4.10.03)
     A reaction: This is a cosmological proof, deriving God as a necessary precondition from the observation that something exists. It is similar to, but not as good as, Aquinas's Third Way (Idea 1431).
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / e. Miracles
If miracles aim at producing belief, it is plausible that their events are very unusual [Locke]
     Full Idea: Where such supernatural events are suitable to ends aim'd at by him who has the power to change the course of nature, they may be fitter to procure belief by how much more they are beyond or contrary to ordinary observation.
     From: John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 4.16.13)
     A reaction: On this occasion there is flat disagreement with Hume, who produced a famous objection to the whole idea of miracles. Locke is struggling here, since he is defending events which are totally contrary to the rest of his epistemology.