Combining Philosophers

Ideas for R.G. Collingwood, Charles Taylor and Gottlob Frege

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6 ideas

28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / d. God decrees morality
Nominalists defended the sovereignty of God against the idea of natural existing good and evil [Taylor,C]
     Full Idea: Late medieval nominalism defended the sovereignty of God as incompatible with there being an order in nature which by itself defined good and bad.
     From: Charles Taylor (Sources of the Self [1989], §3.3)
     A reaction: Part of their attack on Platonism. But what made them place such a high value on the sovereignty of God?
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / a. Ontological Proof
Frege put forward an ontological argument for the existence of numbers [Frege, by Benardete,JA]
     Full Idea: Frege put forward an ontological argument for the existence of numbers.
     From: report of Gottlob Frege (works [1890]) by José A. Benardete - Metaphysics: the logical approach Ch.4
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
The predicate 'exists' is actually a natural language expression for a quantifier [Frege, by Weiner]
     Full Idea: On Frege's logical analysis, the predicate 'exists' is actually a natural language expression for a quantifier.
     From: report of Gottlob Frege (Begriffsschrift [1879]) by Joan Weiner - Frege Ch.8
     A reaction: However see Idea 6067, for McGinn's alternative view of quantifiers. In the normal conventions of predicate logic it may be that existence is treated as a quantifier, but that is not the same as saying that existence just IS a quantifier.
Existence is not a first-level concept (of God), but a second-level property of concepts [Frege, by Potter]
     Full Idea: For Frege (unlike Kant) existence is a genuine concept, but of the second level, not the first. Since God's perfections are of the first level, existence is not a candidate to be one of them.
     From: report of Gottlob Frege (Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Foundations) [1884], §053) by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 09 'App'
     A reaction: That is, God's perfections are of God, but existence is a concept of concepts (that they are instantiated). So existence is a metaconcept. I'm not convinced. If I bake a successful cake, its existence is its most wonderful feature.
Because existence is a property of concepts the ontological argument for God fails [Frege]
     Full Idea: Because existence is a property of concepts the ontological argument for the existence of God breaks down.
     From: Gottlob Frege (Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Foundations) [1884], §53)
     A reaction: The point being that existence (like number) is not a property of actual things. His proposition sounds rather dubious. The concept of unicorns exists quite entertainingly; it is the failure of actual unicorns to exist that is so heartbreaking.
The Ontological Argument fallaciously treats existence as a first-level concept [Frege]
     Full Idea: The ontological proof of God's existence suffers from the fallacy of treating existence as a first-level concept.
     From: Gottlob Frege (Function and Concept [1891], p.38 n)
     A reaction: [See Idea 8490 for first- and second-order functions] This is usually summarised as the idea that existence is a quantifier rather than a predicate.